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Not Just Kid Stuff?  Extending Graham and 
Miller to Adults 
Michael M. O’Hear
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decisions in Graham v. 
Florida
1
 and Miller v. Alabama
2
 are plainly milestones in the field of juvenile 
justice, but do they also point the way to expanded Eighth Amendment pro-
tections for adult defendants?  In Graham, the Court prohibited sentences of 
life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juveniles convict-
ed of nonhomicide offenses.
3
  The holding raises the question of whether 
there should be parallel Eighth Amendment limitations on the ability of a 
state to sentence adults to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.  Then, in Miller, 
the Court prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of 
homicide; the majority held that the sentencing judge must be free to consider 
the juvenile offender’s age as a mitigating factor on a case-by-case basis.
4
  
This raises the question of whether there should be any similar requirement 
mandating the individualized, discretionary sentencing of adults.   
In this Article, I consider the prospects for extending Graham and Miller 
to adults.  I assume that, in the normal spirit of constitutional adjudication, the 
Supreme Court and lower courts will be – and should be – open to extending 
the decisions to new cases presenting reasonably analogous considerations, 
taking into account the holdings of earlier Eighth Amendment decisions and 
the general approach to judging associated with our common law traditions.
5
 
  
 * Professor, Marquette University Law School.  Author, Life Sentences Blog.  
B.A., J.D. Yale University.  I am grateful to Ryan Scoville, Paul Litton, Amy Baron-
Evans, and Paul Hofer for comments on an earlier draft, and to Robert Steele for 
outstanding research assistance. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 2. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 3. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 4. Miller, 132. S. Ct. at 2475. 
 5. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“The 
inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon 
the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise the same capacity which by 
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.”).  To be sure, my com-
mon law approach to understanding the Eighth Amendment in light of the Court’s 
precedent stands in opposition to originalist approaches, which some Justices would 
clearly prefer.  See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
announcing judgment of Court) (“[T]he ultimate question is . . . what [the] meaning 
[of cruel and unusual punishment] was to the Americans who adopted the Eighth 
Amendment.”).  The original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
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The Court’s earlier decisions, however, are a mixed bag, which makes it 
difficult to offer firm conclusions about the meaning and significance of Gra-
ham and Miller.  The central challenge is this: Graham and Miller differ 
markedly in spirit and analytical methodology from the Court’s two prior 
decisions on the constitutionality of noncapital sentences, yet Graham and 
Miller did not overturn the earlier decisions or even offer particularly con-
vincing grounds for distinguishing them.  In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court 
upheld a mandatory LWOP sentence for a drug crime.
6
  Then, in Ewing v. 
California, the Court upheld California’s draconian “three-strikes” law as 
applied to a defendant whose third strike was for a trivial shoplifting offense.
7
  
Despite their minimalist approach to Eighth Amendment protections, Har-
melin and Ewing were recognized as good law in Graham
8
 and Miller,
9
 so 
any account of the latter two decisions must show how they can be reconciled 
with the former. 
In the end, I do not think it possible to fit these decisions together as the 
expression of a single, overarching principle.  Rather, the decisions reflect an 
ad hoc, but not entirely incoherent, balancing of four ideals: (1) proportionali-
ty in punishment; (2) judicial deference to legislative policy choices and state 
court judgments; (3) social reintegration of offenders; and (4) individualized, 
discretionary sentencing.  As the Court developed these concepts in Graham 
and Miller, they do not provide much basis for sweeping reversals of adult 
LWOP sentences.  On the other hand, Graham and Miller may provide a ba-
sis for relief for various specific categories of adult offenders, either in the 
  
is a complex topic lying beyond the scope of this Article.  For a recent assessment of 
the history that provides some originalist support for robust proportionality review, 
see John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011).  In some respects, particularly its 
emphasis on culpability, Stinneford’s historically grounded approach to proportionali-
ty review dovetails with the approach that I describe in Part II below as emerging 
from Graham and Miller.  See id. at 972 (“If the punishment is unjustly harsh in light 
of the defendant’s culpability, it is cruel.”). 
 6. 501 U.S. at 961, 996. 
 7. 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30-31 (2003).  On the same day as Ewing, the Court also 
decided Lockyer v. Andrade, another case affirming a California three-strikes sen-
tence.  538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).  Unlike Ewing, Lockyer was a habeas case, and its 
disposition was controlled by the federal habeas statute.  Id. at 71 (“In this case, we do 
not reach the question whether the state court erred and instead focus solely on 
whether [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief on Andrade’s Eighth Amend-
ment claim.”).  As a result, I do not consider Lockyer to be a central part of the Eighth 
Amendment “canon,” and I do not discuss it further here. 
 8. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (“The approach in cases such as Harmelin 
and Ewing is suited for considering a gross proportionality challenge to a particular 
defendant’s sentence . . . .”). 
 9. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (“Our ruling thus neither overrules nor under-
mines nor conflicts with Harmelin.”). 
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form of an LWOP prohibition for certain kinds of cases (a Graham remedy)
10
 
or a requirement for an individualized, discretionary process before LWOP 
can be imposed (a Miller remedy).
11
 
In further developing these points, the Article proceeds as follows.  Part 
II more fully unpacks the central jurisprudential values that animate Graham 
and Miller.  By reference to these values, Part III explains how Graham and 
Miller may be reconciled with Harmelin and Ewing.  Finally, Part IV discuss-
es the application of Graham and Miller to one particular category of adult 
offenders – those sentenced under the three-strikes provision of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(A) – and concludes that at least some of these offenders may have 
viable Eighth Amendment claims. 
II.  MAKING SENSE OF GRAHAM AND MILLER 
Graham and Miller are centrally concerned with the ideal of proportion-
ality in punishment, but neither opinion is structured as simply an open-ended 
inquiry into the excessiveness of a challenged sentence.  Rather, the propor-
tionality analysis of both opinions seems conditioned by a set of collateral 
considerations – considerations that may influence the rigor of the propor-
tionality analysis and the Court’s choice of remedies.  These considerations 
include ideals relating to judicial deference, the reintegration of offenders into 
society, and discretionary, individualized sentencing.   
This Part first explores the proportionality analysis of Graham and    
Miller, and then describes the role played by the conditioning considerations.  
It concludes that the Court may be heading toward a sliding-scale approach to 
Eighth Amendment review, similar to that which it uses in other areas of con-
stitutional jurisprudence.  
A.  Proportionality 
Graham and Miller are explicitly premised on the belief that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits disproportionately harsh punishments.  As the Court 
put it in Graham: “Embodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments is the precept of justice that punishment for crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to the offense.”
12
  Thus, the Court has banned 
various sentencing practices “based on mismatches between the culpability of 
a class of offenders and the severity of the penalty.”
13
  This Section discusses 
the basic structure of the “mismatch” analysis in Graham and Miller, unpacks 
the factors that the Court has particularly used to assess culpability, and final-
  
 10. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.  
 11. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 12. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 13. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23).  
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ly considers the role of utilitarian purposes of punishment (deterrence, inca-
pacitation, and rehabilitation) in the Court’s reasoning. 
1.  Basic Structure of the Analysis: Categorical, Ordinal Ranking of 
Offenses and Penalties 
Despite the popularity of glib proportionality formulae like “an eye for 
eye,” it is not at all clear how to translate a given level of offense severity into 
a particular sentence, especially when the sentence is a term of imprisonment.  
The units of measure for offense severity and punishment severity seem 
wholly incommensurable.  Contemporary proportionality theory has met the 
problem by adopting an ordinal, as opposed to a cardinal, orientation; that is, 
the most serious category of crime should be punished with the most serious 
punishment, the second-most serious category of crime should be punished 
with the second-most serious punishment, and so forth.
14
 
This logic seems very much in line with Graham’s approach to propor-
tionality.  Thus, for instance, Graham tells us that nonhomicide offenders 
must not be exposed to the worst punishment available to murderers – that is, 
the death penalty – because nonhomicide offenders are categorically less 
culpable than murderers.
15
  Likewise, in light of the various deliberation- and 
character-related considerations to be discussed below, “when compared to an 
adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a 
twice diminished moral culpability.”
16
  This calls for punishment that is also 
at least twice diminished, or, in other words, for something less than 
LWOP.
17
  Conceptually speaking, it is easy to imagine this “degrees-of-
diminution” formula being extended in various ways; for instance, by prohib-
iting a twice-diminished punishment (relative to the death penalty) from be-
ing imposed in cases of thrice-diminished culpability (relative to adult homi-
cide).
18
  This categorical, ordinal approach provides the basic structure of the 
proportionality analysis under Graham and Miller. 
  
 14. Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate 
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1255-56 (2011) (citing Andrew von Hirsch, 
Penal Theories, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 659, 668 (Michael 
Tonry ed., 1998)). 
 15. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. To be sure, although this approach is conceptually straightforward enough, 
there might be important practical difficulties in deciding where to draw the lines; for 
instance, should a sentence of life with parole eligibility after fifty years be treated 
like LWOP as once diminished, or should it be regarded as categorically less severe?  
Does the answer depend on the age and health of the defendant?  On the liberality of 
the parole standards and practices of the jurisdiction?  It seems that there must neces-
sarily be some arbitrariness around the margins in the line-drawing process; such 
practical difficulties, however, should not necessarily lead the courts to abandon any 
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2.  Culpability Factors 
If the proportionality analysis requires a culpability-based comparison 
between the offender before us and an adult murderer, we must have some 
criteria for assessing culpability.  Although the Court has not set forth such 
criteria in a systematic fashion, we can infer a workable list from the reason-
ing of Graham and other Eighth Amendment decisions. 
a.  Harm 
The Court has emphasized the importance of harm in distinguishing the 
culpability of different classes of offenders, particularly in distinguishing 
between those guilty of homicide and those guilty of lesser crimes.  Graham 
put it this way: 
 
There is a line between homicide and other serious violent of-
fenses against the individual.  Serious nonhomicide crimes may 
be devastating in their harm but in terms of moral depravity and 
of the injury to the person and to the public, they cannot be 
compared to murder in their severity and irrevocability.  This is 
because life is over for the victim of the murderer, but for the 
victim of even a very serious nonhomicide crime, life is not 
over and normally is not beyond repair.  Although an offense 
like robbery or rape is a serious crime deserving serious pun-
ishment, those crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral 
sense.
19
 
 
Thus, although proportionality theorists are divided on the question of 
whether resulting harm should matter in assessing offense gravity,
20
 the Court 
seems to have embraced harm as a key consideration.
21
 
  
effort to extend Graham’s categorical-proportionality logic beyond juvenile LWOP.  
Indeed, Graham itself created various difficult line-drawing problems even in the 
juvenile LWOP area, for instance, with respect to the question of what it means for 
juvenile offenders to be given some “realistic opportunity to obtain release.”  See 
generally Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide a Meaning-
ful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24 
ST. T. L. REV. 310, 314 (2012).  There would be few principles of justice left standing 
if courts limited themselves to those that could be enforced without engaging in any 
contestable line-drawing. 
 19. 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (alterations in original omitted) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 797 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle     
of “Limiting Retributivism”: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than          
Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 13 (2003) (“[P]eople disagree about         
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b.  Intent and Deliberation 
In addition to the objective harm done, the Court also sees the defend-
ant’s subjective state as an important aspect of culpability.  This seems to 
include the traditional criminal law concept of “intent.”  For instance, while 
the Court sometimes seems to define the most serious culpability category 
exclusively by reference to resulting harm (as in the previously quoted pas-
sage), at other times the Court discusses the homicide category more broadly 
as also encompassing those who merely “intend to kill” or even “foresee that 
life will be taken.”
22
  The suggestion seems to be that a sufficiently blame-
worthy state of mind may elevate the seriousness of a crime beyond what 
would normally be expected based solely on the objective harm.  If so, the 
converse might also be true – that is, an offender might not be held fully ac-
countable for a harm that was neither intended nor foreseen.
23
 
While intent and knowledge do seem important to the culpability calcu-
lus, the Court has also suggested a broader view of what counts in an evalua-
tion of the offender’s state of mind, including a constellation of factors that 
might collectively be labeled “deliberation.”
24
  The Court seems to be asking 
to what extent the offender’s actions reflected a free, informed, and carefully 
considered choice to do wrong.  Thus, various deliberation-related impair-
ments specific to juveniles played a prominent role in justifying the Court’s 
decisions in Graham and Miller.  Citing Graham and Roper v. Simmons, the 
Court summarized its reasoning this way in Miller:  
 
  
what affects blameworthiness.  The most dramatic example I can think of is that some 
people  think that resulting harm ought to increase punishment while others think it 
ought not and that the focus should be only on things like one's conduct, culpability, 
and capacities.”).  
 21. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819-20 (1991).  The Court has also em-
braced the relevance of harm to culpability in its leading decision on the admissibility 
of victim impact evidence.  Id.  I’m grateful to Paul Litton for reminding me of this. 
 22. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 23. The relative weight to ascribe to harm and intent has been a subject of    
considerable debate among punishment theorists.  Michael Moore suggests that we 
ought to think about the relationship this way: the subjective aspects of culpability 
(which he labels simply “culpability”) are both necessary and sufficient for punish-
ment; however, when these are present, the harm (“wrongdoing”) “independently 
influences how much punishment is deserved.”  MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: 
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1997).  “Indeed . . . the amount of 
wrong done may often swamp the degree of culpability with which it is done as the 
major determinant of how much punishment is deserved.”  Id.  This approach seems 
consistent with the Court’s discussion of proportionality in Graham, although the 
Court’s analysis is sufficiently imprecise that it would be unwise to assume that it 
intends to endorse any particular systematic theory of proportionality.  See Graham, 
130 S. Ct. at 2021-22. 
 24. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).  
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Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater pro-
spects for reform, . . . they are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.  [Prior] cases relied on three significant gaps be-
tween juveniles and adults.  First, children have a lack of ma-
turity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to 
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.  Second, 
children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including from their family and peers; they have lim-
ited control over their own environment and lack the ability to 
extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.  
And third, a child’s character is not as well formed as an 
adult’s; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be 
evidence of irretrievable depravity.
25
 
 
On such grounds, Graham was able to conclude that a “juvenile is not 
absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression is not as mor-
ally reprehensible as that of an adult”;
26
 hence, “because juveniles have less-
ened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”
27
 
c.  Character 
The Court’s discussion of deliberation-related factors bleeds into anoth-
er dimension of proportionality review – the offender’s character.  Note, for 
instance, the third “gap” in the preceding quotation from Miller, which sug-
gests that juveniles should be regarded as less culpable because their crimes 
are less likely to serve as reliable “evidence of irretrievable depravity.”
28
  
This seems a conceptually distinct inquiry from questions like how much 
harm was done and with what state of mind. 
Emphasizing character is an idiosyncratic move by the Court.
29
  In con-
temporary punishment theory, culpability and proportionality are more typi-
cally thought of in relation to a specific voluntary act and not as a function of 
characteristics intrinsic to the offender’s person.
30
  For example, we are 
  
 25. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (alterations in original 
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 
569, 570) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 
835 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
 28. 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (alteration in original omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S.  
at 570).  
 29. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 23, at 191 (“The concept of responsibility pre-
supposed by Anglo-American criminal law is one whereby . . . persons . . . are re-
sponsible for their choices (not their characters).”). 
 30. See, e.g., id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that 
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commonly told to condemn the sin, not the sinner; as such, it may seem unfair 
and illiberal to punish based on who the offender is rather than what the of-
fender has done.  Yet, for Eighth Amendment purposes the Court indicated 
that it considers “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their 
crimes and characteristics.”
31
 
At noncapital sentencing, offender characteristics are normally           
addressed not in connection with culpability, which is a moral judgment, but 
in an effort to assess dangerousness: does the offender require simple inca-
pacitation, or can the offender be expected to respond favorably to rehabilita-
tive treatment?  Yet Graham spoke of character in unmistakably moral terms.  
For instance, the Court observed that “from a moral standpoint[,] it would   
be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for        
a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be     
reformed.”
32
  Indeed, the key words chosen by the Court in Graham and  
Miller – words like “character,” “depravity,” and “corruption” – have a    
distinctly moral valence, especially in comparison with more technocratic 
phrases, such as “risk assessment” or “likelihood of recidivism,” that might 
have been used instead.
33
 
Although it may be unusual to treat character as an aspect of culpability 
or proportionality, the Court would not be entirely alone or beyond justifica-
tion in doing so.  An established Aristotelian, or “aretaic,” tradition of    
thinking about punishment focuses on character in ways that share something 
of the same spirit as Graham and Miller.
34
  In the words of Professor Kyron 
  
includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically 
capable.”). 
 31. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Roper. 543 U.S. at 568) (emphasis add-
ed); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (referring to “precept of justice that punish-
ment for crime should be graduated . . . to both the offender and the offense” (empha-
sis added) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 568) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 32. 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (alteration in original omitted) (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Roper. 543 U.S. at 568) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 33. Although Miller borrows the moralistic phraseology from Graham, the more 
recent opinion does not as clearly treat the character question as an aspect of culpabil-
ity.  For instance, in explaining why juveniles are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments, Miller observed that its “findings – of transient rashness, proclivity for 
risk, and inability to assess consequences – both lessened a child’s moral culpability 
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development 
occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
language suggests that culpability assessment is to be regarded as a separate consider-
ation from whether the offender’s character deficiencies are likely to be reformed.  
Still, whether or not Miller contemplates that character goes to culpability, there is no 
question that Miller treats character, or something much like it, as part of the propor-
tionality calculus.  See id. at 2467.  
 34. For a general discussion of the aretaic theory of punishment, see Kyron Hui-
gens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (2002). 
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Huigens, a leading exponent of this view, the aretaic theory of punishment 
“takes the principal justifying purpose of punishment to be the inculcation    
of virtue”
35
 – that is, “a capacity for sound practical judgment, both on        
the occasion of action and in the assembly and maintenance of one’s system 
of ends and standing motivations.”
36
  On this view, a finding of criminal fault 
is “an inference . . . to the effect that the defendant’s practical reasoning        
is flawed or deficient.”
37
  Criminal fault, thus understood, is punished because 
“we bear a responsibility to others to conceive and pursue our ends in a     
way that promotes the greater good.  Defining the good and determining ends 
are acts over which we maintain some control and upon which the well-   
being of others depends.”
38
  Such a line of thinking may provide a plausible 
justification for the Court’s suggestion that character is a subject fit for     
culpability judgments.
39
   
3.  Downplaying of Utilitarian Purposes 
As the Court observed in Graham, culpability is typically seen as the 
particular concern of retributive approaches to punishment.
40
  In theory, how-
ever, punishments that are excessive relative to culpability might nonetheless 
effectively serve utilitarian crime-control ends through deterrence, incapacita-
tion, or rehabilitation.  Under Graham and Miller, these utilitarian purposes 
  
 35. Id. at 99. 
 36. Id. at 98. 
 37. Id. at 107. 
 38. Id. at 117.  
 39. Moreover, the aretaic theory also provides a basis for limiting penal severity 
insofar as punishment bears on the virtue of the “punishing majority”: as we punish, 
we must acknowledge that the way we do so defines our own character.  Id. at 120-21.  
It would be hypocrisy, for instance, for us to punish a defendant for failing to make a 
selfless choice that we would not be willing to make either.  Id. at 121.  Likewise, as 
Huigens argues, ours would be “a brutal society instead of an enlightened one” were 
we to punish a defendant whose mental illness deprived him of the ability to “assess 
and govern his own conduct.”  Id. 
  Analogous reasoning may underlie the Court’s treatment of juvenile status  
in Graham and Miller.  We might say, for instance, that punishment of juveniles must 
be moderated because we were all young and foolish once, with deficient practical 
reasoning, and there would be a certain flavor of hypocrisy not to recognize that        
at sentencing.  Moreover, the juvenile does not have a fully developed capacity to 
assess and govern his own conduct, and there does seem something brutal about  
punishing him as if he did.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).  
Finally, young people are not yet full-fledged, autonomous members of our society, 
and as such we should not expect them to shoulder an adult level of responsibility.  In 
sum, a young person’s crime simply does not carry the same social significance as 
that of an adult. 
 40. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 
481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).  
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have a role to play in the Eighth Amendment analysis, but the role is uncer-
tain and seems secondary to the culpability considerations described above. 
For instance, in describing its general approach to the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Graham Court indicated that it would assess the “culpability of    
the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics,” but then 
added that it would “also consider[] whether the challenged sentencing prac-
tice serves legitimate penological goals.”
41
  The Court thus seemed to indicate 
that the moral fit between culpability and punishment alone was not the      
be-all and end-all of the Eighth Amendment analysis; however, it did not 
elaborate on how precisely the broader assessment of penological goals might 
affect its reasoning.
42
 
Still, the Court did make clear that utilitarian benefits would not neces-
sarily save an otherwise-disproportionate sentence.  Thus, the Court acknowl-
edged the possibility of deterrence benefits from juvenile LWOP but con-
cluded, “Here, in light of juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ diminished moral 
responsibility, any limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole is 
not enough to justify the sentence.”
43
  The Court seemed to reach a similar 
conclusion as to incapacitation.
44
  
The Court may have a sliding-scale approach in mind, which might 
work in ways that parallel the constitutional analysis in other areas of law.  
For instance, when a sentence does not appear disproportionate relative to 
culpability, the Court might employ a deferential rational basis review to 
determine whether the sentence is penologically justified.
 
 However, when a 
sentence is excessive relative to culpability, a more rigorous approach to judi-
cial review might be appropriate.
45
  This seems at least roughly consistent 
with the reasoning in Graham.
46
  
  
 41. Id. at 2026. 
 42. See id. at 2028.  
 43. Id. at 2029. 
 44. See id. (“Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the 
Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”).  By con-
trast, the Court found no plausible rehabilitation benefits to LWOP.  Id. at 2029-30.  
  Miller treated utilitarian goals in much the same way as Graham, giving such 
goals little emphasis in comparison to proportionality.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.  
Indeed, in its general summary of the Eighth Amendment analysis, Miller made no 
reference at all to the broader penological-goals test, but instead simply discussed 
proportionality.  Id. at 2463.  On the other hand, as suggested above, Miller may have 
reconceptualized proportionality so as to incorporate incapacitation- and rehabilita-
tion-type concerns.  See discussion supra note 33. 
 45. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (“Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational 
basis review normally pass constitutional muster . . . .  We have consistently         
held, however, that some objectives, such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state interests.  When a law exhibits such a desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form           
of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.” 
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(citations omitted)); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘funda-
mental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these        
rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and that legislative en-
actments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at 
stake.” (citations omitted)). 
 46. The role of utilitarian considerations in the Eighth Amendment analysis has 
been a matter of particular debate and uncertainty in both the Supreme Court deci-
sions and the scholarly literature.  See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right 
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005).  As Youngjae Lee has 
observed, the Ewing plurality opinion rests on what he calls the “disjunctive theory,” 
that is, the idea that a sentence survives Eighth Amendment review if it can be justi-
fied on the basis of any of the major purposes of punishment, even if it is excessive in 
relation to all of the rest.  Id. at 682.  Lee argues that the disjunctive theory is “wrong-
headed” and that the Eighth Amendment restriction on excessive punishment should 
instead be understood as a retributively grounded “side constraint” on a state’s ability 
to pursue the utilitarian purposes of punishment.  Id. at 683.  On this view, a punish-
ment that goes beyond what is permitted by retributive proportionality might be un-
constitutional, regardless of its deterrence and incapacitation benefits.  Id. at 684.  
Although the Court has not explicitly embraced this side constraint view, Lee ob-
serves – correctly, I think – that the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment decisions in 
capital cases indicate that the Court no longer takes the disjunctive approach very 
seriously.  See Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 
58, 58 (2010).  Lee depicts Graham as an extension of this trend into the noncapital 
arena.  Id. at 59-60.  He suggests that Graham may be pointing in the direction of a 
new approach to Eighth Amendment analysis similar to the sliding scale I have de-
scribed above.  See id. at 60 (“If a punishment fails the culpability test, then the pun-
ishment is presumptively unconstitutional and a compelling reason is needed to over-
come the presumption of unconstitutionality.  That is, the Eighth Amendment right 
against excessive punishment is defined by the retributivist constraint . . . but the right 
is not absolute.” (emphasis in original)). 
  Richard Frase has suggested a somewhat different approach.  He argues that 
proportionality is not necessarily a retributive concept, but that three different ap-
proaches to proportionality should (and do) inform the determination of whether a 
challenged punishment is permissible.  Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, 
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 575-76 (2005).  The first approach, limiting retributivism, 
employs retributive proportionality as a side constraint on punishment, as Lee pro-
posed.  Id. at 591.  The second approach, ends disproportionality, considers whether 
the punishment’s costs and burdens outweigh its likely benefits.  Id. at 592.  The third 
and final approach, means proportionality, considers whether there are less costly or 
burdensome means available to achieve the same benefits.  Id.  In Frase’s view, a 
punishment would be unconstitutional if it was “grossly disproportionate” under any 
of the three approaches to proportionality, subject to confirmation through intra- and 
inter-state comparisons.  Id. at 633-34.  Consistent with this view, Frase finds in Gra-
ham some support for the idea that “retributive disproportionality might, by itself, be 
a basis for finding a prison sentence to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”  
Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News – and Not, FED. SENT’G REP. Oct. 2010, at 
55.  He also sees in Justice Kennedy’s analysis some implicit consideration of the two 
nonretributive proportionality principles, but criticizes Kennedy for not expressly 
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B.  Conditioning Considerations 
While proportionality seems to be the Court’s central concern in Gra-
ham and Miller, the Court’s analysis seems conditioned by a set of considera-
tions that are only tangentially related to proportionality.  The Court has not 
precisely defined the role played by these considerations, but a careful read-
ing of Graham and Miller does provide some sense of what the Court may 
have in mind.  This Section first assesses the Court’s treatment of a trio of 
considerations that seem connected to the ideal of judicial deference, and then 
turns to two additional considerations relating to the social reintegration of 
offenders and individualized, discretionary sentencing. 
1.  Deference 
The deference ideal demands respect for the work of legislatures and 
lower courts, with an eye toward preserving the legitimacy of the judiciary 
(which might be undermined, for instance, by starkly counter-majoritarian 
decision making); the stability of law and legal judgments; the role of state-
level autonomy and experimentation in our federalist system of government; 
and the comparative advantages of legislatures in making policy choices and 
local trial judges in determining appropriate sentences in light of particular 
community circumstances and values.
47
  Such ends are obviously disserved if 
the Supreme Court issues sweeping Eighth Amendment decisions that over-
turn well-established laws or legal practices, especially when the decisions 
are seen as a product of the idiosyncratic social values of five unelected Jus-
tices.  The Court does make an effort to avoid such negative perceptions of its 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, albeit perhaps not as much of an effort as 
some would like to see. 
Reflecting such an effort, Graham and Miller devote considerable atten-
tion to a trio of deference-related variables: frequency of the challenged sen-
tence in practice, extent of deliberate legislative support for the sentence, and 
consistency of the sentence with international legal norms.  Before describing 
  
indicating “that the two nonretributive proportionality principles are independent of 
each other, so that a violation of either principle can invalidate a proposed nonretribu-
tive punishment rationale.”  Id. at 55-57.  Thus, like Lee (and me), Frase thinks that 
Graham leaves open the possibility that in some circumstances a retributively dispro-
portionate sentence might be saved by a sufficiently compelling utilitarian justifica-
tion – a possibility that Frase finds regrettable.  Id. at 54. 
 47. Several of these points were expressly noted as important Eighth Amend-
ment concerns in Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.  
501 U.S. 957, 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); see also Michel M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering 
Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 2135-55 (2010) (discussing justifications 
for deference by appellate courts to sentencing decisions made by trial court judges). 
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these variables in more detail, though, it is helpful to appreciate that the dis-
cussions of deference are framed somewhat differently in the two cases.   
Graham addressed deference through its determination that a “national 
consensus” existed against juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide crimes.
48
  This 
conclusion of a national consensus, however, seems far too strong based on 
the available evidence, particularly, as the dissenters pointed out, in light of 
the frequency with which legislatures have approved juvenile LWOP.
49
   
Miller considered a similar body of evidence, but eschewed a “national 
consensus” conclusion, speaking instead in a more open-ended way of     
“objective indicia” of public attitudes.
50
  Perhaps this marks a turn away from 
the misleading “national consensus” framework that the Court employed      
in its earlier Eighth Amendment decisions.
51
  I follow Miller’s lead in    
avoiding the language of “national consensus”; what the Court has really 
been doing, I think, in its purported search for “consensus” has been assessing 
the relative strength of the case for deference in light of the considerations 
described below.   
a.  Frequency of the Challenged Sentence in Practice 
In Graham, the most important deference consideration may have been 
the infrequency of the challenged sentence (juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide 
crimes).  Indeed, the Court went to some pains to establish that only 123 “ju-
venile nonhomicide offenders” were serving LWOP sentences nationwide 
when the case was decided.
52
  The number was particularly impressive in 
light of the many tens of thousands of juveniles arrested each year for aggra-
vated assault, robbery, and other serious offenses.
53
  Such infrequency in the 
imposition of a challenged sentence makes clear that overturning the sentence 
will not impose major disruptions on the day-to-day functioning of state crim-
inal justice systems and also diminishes concerns that the Court is acting in a 
starkly counter-majoritarian way.
54
 
In contrast, Miller potentially affects a much higher number of sentenc-
es; at the time of the decision, the actual number of individuals serving man-
datory LWOP for juvenile homicides apparently exceeded 2,000.
55
  Yet, even 
for homicide, the Court found juvenile LWOP to be a rare and disfavored 
  
 48. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 49. Id. at 2048-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 50. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470-71 (2012).  
 51. For another controversial use of the “national consensus” framework in addi-
tion to Graham, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422-26 (2008). 
 52. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024. 
 53. Id. at 2025. 
 54. Although neither the Court’s nor my approach to the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause has been particularly textual, the importance of infrequency 
could also be justified through its natural connection to the term “unusual.” 
 55. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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sentence based on data from jurisdictions in which juvenile LWOP was dis-
cretionary, noting “[t]hat figure indicates that when given the choice, sen-
tencers impose life without parole on children relatively rarely.  And . . . [the 
Court has] held that when judges and juries do not often choose to impose a 
sentence, it at least should not be mandatory.”
56
 
b.  Deliberate Legislative Support for the Sentence 
Although precedent indicated that legislation was the “clearest and   
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values,”
57
 in Graham      
and Miller the Court seemed to effectively reject this view.  Indeed, Graham 
overturned the law in thirty-nine U.S. jurisdictions including the federal   
system and the District of Columbia, while Miller overturned the law in twen-
ty-nine jurisdictions.
58
 
In both cases, the Court downplayed the legislative evidence in light of 
concerns that the legislation reflected a sort of inadvertence, rather than a 
deliberate choice.  As the Court observed in Miller: 
 
Almost all jurisdictions allow some juveniles to be tried in 
adult court for some kinds of homicide.  But most States do 
not have separate penalty provisions for those juvenile of-
fenders.  Of the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole 
for children, more than half do so by virtue of generally ap-
plicable penalty provisions, imposing the sentence without 
regard to age.  And indeed, some of those States set no mini-
mum age for who may be transferred to adult court in the first 
instance, thus applying life-without-parole mandates to chil-
dren of any age – be it 17 or 14 or 10 or 6.  As in Graham, we 
think that underscores that the statutory eligibility of a juve-
nile offender for life without parole does not indicate that the 
penalty has been endorsed through deliberate, express, and 
full legislative consideration.
59
 
 
Of course, such an absence of deliberate choice undercuts the general 
assumption that overturning legislation contravenes majoritarian preferences. 
  
 56. Id. at 2472 n.10.  
 57. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). 
 58. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 59. Id. at 2473 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Flori-
da, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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c.  Consistency with International Legal Norms 
In addition to U.S. law and practice, Graham also looked to internation-
al legal norms, stating, “[T]he judgment of the world’s nations that a particu-
lar sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic principles of decency 
demonstrates that the Court’s rationale has respected reasoning to support 
it.”
60
  Although the Court’s citation of international norms in Eighth Amend-
ment cases has proven controversial,
61
 this can be understood as a deference-
oriented device to help ensure that Eighth Amendment holdings are not mere-
ly the products of the idiosyncratic social values of five justices, but are in-
stead in accord with widespread, objectively ascertainable human-rights 
norms.  Moreover, an inconsistency between state law and nearly universal 
international norms may heighten suspicions that the state law did not result 
from a deliberate, well-informed policy choice.  
International legal norms thus join frequency in practice and deliberate 
legislative choice as important factors in deciding how much deference to 
give to a challenged sentence or sentencing law.  Such a threshold determina-
tion might play a decisive role in the constitutional analysis in many – per-
haps even most – cases, given the looseness of the proportionality test.
62
  In 
other words, because there will often be room for reasonable minds to differ 
over how many times “diminished” a given punishment or offender is from 
the most serious, it will often be critical whether the analysis is undertaken 
with a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged 
sentence or law, a weak presumption, or no presumption at all. 
2.  Social Reintegration of Offenders 
Among the conditioning considerations, the deference factors received 
the most extensive and explicit treatment in Graham and Miller.  However, 
there do seem to be additional considerations that played a role in the Court’s 
thinking.  For instance, the Court’s proportionality analysis does not by itself 
seem quite capable of justifying the breadth of the holding in Graham.  Ra-
ther, the holding also seems to rest on a particular aversion to the sort of per-
manent social exclusion represented by LWOP. 
Recall that the Graham Court adopted a flat prohibition on juvenile 
LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.
63
  In so doing, the Court expressly rejected 
the alternative that courts “take the offender’s age into consideration as part 
of a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry, weighing it against the 
  
 60. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 61. For a defense of this practice, see Jessica Olive & David Gray, A Modest 
Appeal for Decent Respect, FED. SENT’G REP., Oct. 2010, at 72. 
 62. See discussion supra note 46. 
 63. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.  
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seriousness of the crime.”
64
  Although the Court conceded the possibility that 
LWOP might indeed be an appropriate sentence for some juvenile nonhomi-
cide offenders, the Court was not convinced that the decision could be made 
with “sufficient accuracy.”
65
  
The Court thus chose a categorical, prophylactic rule that eliminated the 
risk of one type of error: the false positive (that is, an incorrect determination 
that a juvenile nonhomicide offender deserves LWOP).
66
  At the same time, 
the Court enhanced the risk of a different type of error: the false negative 
(that is, an incorrect determination that a juvenile nonhomicide offender does 
not deserve LWOP).  If there are any cases in which a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender actually deserves LWOP, which is a possibility that the Court did 
not reject, then Graham guarantees erroneous – that is, disproportionately 
lenient – sentences in those cases.  Thus, Graham cannot be taken at face 
value as a decision that is driven by concern for accuracy in proportionality 
decisions.  Rather, Graham trades off one type of risk of error for another, 
implicitly revealing that one type of error is of more concern to the Court than 
the other. 
Why was Graham more concerned about false positives than false nega-
tives?  The Court first suggested that there might be systemic tendencies to 
impose overly harsh sentences for juveniles.  Quoting its earlier decision in 
Roper v. Simmons, which banned the juvenile death penalty, the Court ob-
served that an “unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-
blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating argu-
ments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offend-
er’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should 
require a sentence less severe than death.”
67
  Further exacerbating the risk of 
error were the “special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile repre-
sentation,” such as the tendency for juveniles to mistrust adults.
68
   
Yet it is far from clear that juvenile status tends, on the whole, to create 
a greater risk of false positives than false negatives.  The majority in Graham 
clearly appreciated that youth was a mitigating factor, and there is no       
reason to think that the justices on the Supreme Court are possessed of some 
special moral sensitivity that is not shared by judges in lower sentencing 
courts.  Indeed, the very rarity of juvenile LWOP sentences that seemed so 
important in Graham and Miller would belie any claim that the brutality of a 
crime commonly “overpower[s]” the mitigating aspects of youth.
69
              
Of course, this is not to say that juvenile LWOP sentences are never dispro-
portionately harsh, but it suggests that any systemic tendencies to over-
  
 64. Id. at 2031. 
 65. Id. at 2032. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
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harshness likely operate on the margins and are frequently offset by systemic 
tendencies to lenience.  Graham himself initially received a sentence of pro-
bation for a violent armed robbery attempt;
70
 the life sentence was not im-
posed until after Graham violated his probation and the case was transferred 
to a different judge.
71
 
In light of the uncertainty as to whether the likelihood of false positives 
really is substantially greater than the likelihood of false negatives, the cate-
gorical rule of Graham likely arises, at least in part, from another considera-
tion: whatever their relative frequency, false positives are simply a less ac-
ceptable type of error than false negatives – thus, courts should err in favor of 
a lesser sentence than LWOP.  Indeed, as if recognizing the difficulties with 
relying on accuracy concerns alone, the Court offered another justification for 
its categorical rule: such a rule “gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a 
chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”
72
  The significance of the word 
“all” in this context is not entirely clear, but it seems best read to emphasize 
the Court’s interest in giving even those juvenile offenders whose crimes real-
ly merit LWOP an opportunity to “demonstrate maturity and reform.”
73
  After 
all, the word appears in response to the suggestion that judges should have the 
freedom to impose LWOP in cases involving “particularly heinous crimes.”
74
  
The Court is trying to give us a reason to prefer false negatives over false 
positives; everyone should eventually be given a chance to demonstrate ma-
turity and reform, even those who have committed “particularly heinous 
crimes” involving the sort of aggravated culpability that may not really quali-
fy as “twice diminished.”
75
 
In determining why, the Court’s precise choice of words may again be 
telling.  The Court speaks of “demonstrat[ing] maturity and reform.”
76
          
A “demonstration” implies a social act – there is an audience and a judgment 
of the quality of the act.  Thus, the Court does not contemplate that the re-
formed offender will enjoy his newfound maturity in isolation.  Rather, ma-
turity and reform are pathways to what Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author 
of the majority opinion in Graham, elsewhere called “ordinary civic life in a 
free society.”
77
 
Graham seems to embrace a particular vision of human flourishing – a 
vision that is essentially social and centered on the individual’s moral rela-
tionships with others.  Consider, for instance, the Court’s explanation of why 
  
 70. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018. 
 71. Id. at 2019-20. 
 72. Id. at 2032. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2031. 
 75. Cf. id. at 2030 (finding that it is “not appropriate” for “the State [to]     
make[] an irrevocable judgment about [a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s] value and 
place in society”). 
 76. Id. at 2032. 
 77. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
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LWOP raises the “same concerns” as the death penalty: “Life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison 
walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”
78
  The four-way 
association is striking, with the Court linking death, hopelessness, physical 
separation from society, and moral separation from society.  A life of social 
exclusion, the Court suggests, is hardly a life at all.
79
   
While exclusion from society may be ordered, the period of exclusion 
can and should be an occasion for the offender to make atonement for his 
crimes, rather than merely a time to await release or death.  The real evil of 
LWOP is that the sentence eliminates incentives for atonement and precludes 
the possibility of reconciliation with society: 
 
Terrance Graham’s sentence guarantees that he will die in pris-
on without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no 
matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he 
committed as a teenager are not representative of his true char-
acter, even if he spends the next half century attempting to 
atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.  The State has 
denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to re-
join society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he com-
mitted while he was a child in the eyes of the law.  This the 
Eighth Amendment does not permit.
80
 
 
While the Court’s express focus here is on the moral status of the of-
fender, the Court’s reasoning also seems implicitly premised on the moral 
responsibility of society to respond to efforts made by the offender to achieve 
atonement.  In a moral-relational view of human flourishing, we must remain 
open to the possibility of reconciliation with those who have wronged us; 
otherwise, we stunt our own moral development and capacity for fulfill-
ment.
81
  Fear and hatred can be prisons, too – Graham seems at some level an 
effort to remind us of this great truth.  Providing offenders with a realistic 
path back to “ordinary civic life in a free society” may be as much for our 
benefit as theirs.
82
  To be sure, the Court was hardly explicit about such moral 
  
 78. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 79. Id. at 2032-33 (“Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no 
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, 
no hope.”).  
 80. Id. at 2033. 
 81. Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, Solving the Good-Time Puzzle: Why Following the 
Rules Should Get You out of Prison Early, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 195, 220 (“[T]he of-
fender who performs well in prison has indicated a desire and a capacity to reform . . . 
We owe it to him and to ourselves to respond in some positive fashion . . . .”). 
 82. This line of thinking may profitably be connected to Professor Huigens’ 
insight that we constitute our collective character in important ways through our penal 
practices.  See discussion supra note 39; see also Huigens, supra note 34, at 120-21. 
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foundations to its reasoning, but intuitions along these lines seem to underlie 
Graham’s choice of a broad prophylactic remedy and help to illuminate the 
Court’s particular concerns with LWOP as a sentence. 
3.  Preference for Individualized, Discretionary Sentencing 
Miller’s basic holding – no mandatory LWOP even for juvenile killers – 
seems puzzling in light of Graham’s proportionality analysis.  After all, the 
juvenile killer does not have Graham’s “twice diminished moral culpabil-
ity.”
83
  Because juvenile status only once diminishes the culpability of      
defendants like Miller, the second-most severe sentence (LWOP) should      
be presumptively constitutional.  It is not entirely clear why a categorical 
safeguard such as the Miller rule is warranted for this set of cases.  Rather 
than overturning a mandatory sentencing law adopted by a majority of the 
states, the Court might have instead relegated defendants like Miller to    
case-by-case challenges to their sentences – an approach that would have 
recognized the presumptively constitutional nature of LWOP for killers, 
while preserving an opportunity for relief in unusual cases involving        
additional culpability-diminution. 
In embracing a categorical protection, the Court again invoked a con-
cern about inaccuracy, as it had in Graham: “By making youth (and all that 
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, [a 
mandatory LWOP] scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punish-
ment.”
84
  But, standing alone, this concern seems even less compelling as a 
justification for a categorical rule than it was in Graham.  After all, Graham 
dealt with a presumptively disproportionate class of sentences, while Miller 
seemingly dealt merely with “once diminished” punishment for “once dimin-
ished” culpability. 
In short, it is difficult to account for Miller except by reference to a par-
ticular distrust of mandatory sentencing.  After all, under Miller a type of 
punishment – LWOP for juvenile killers – that is categorically acceptable if 
imposed on a discretionary basis is now unconstitutional solely where it is 
mandatory.
85
  It is not entirely clear why Miller adopted this double standard, 
but the Court’s reasoning suggests at least three mutually supporting possibil-
ities.  First, the Miller rule may reflect deference considerations.  For in-
stance, in response to the states’ argument that the number of jurisdictions 
employing mandatory juvenile LWOP precluded holding the practice uncon-
stitutional, the Miller Court observed: 
  
 83. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (quoting Graham, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2027). 
 84. Id. at 2469. 
 85. More recently, the Court again indicated its distaste for mandatory          
sentencing in Alleyne v. United States, in which the Court held that the facts trigger-
ing a minimum must be found by a jury instead of a judge. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158, 
2163 (2013). 
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[T]he cases here are different from the typical one in which we 
have tallied legislative enactments.  Our decision does not cate-
gorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime . 
. . .  Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain 
process – considering an offender’s youth and attendant cir-
cumstances – before imposing a particular penalty.
86
 
 
The Court thus seemed to treat its holding as less of an infringement on 
the autonomy of state criminal justice systems than earlier Eight Amendment 
decisions; after all, Miller did not rule out LWOP as a sentence for any class 
of offense or class of offender but only spoke to the process by which the 
sentence may be selected.
87
  In so doing, Miller actually augmented the power 
of state trial court judges, even as it somewhat constricted the scope of legis-
lative policy choice.  Such a dynamic may lessen deference concerns that 
would otherwise call for upholding a challenged sentence. 
Second, the Court indicated that, as a mitigating factor, juvenile status in 
particular may demand individualized assessment because it can affect culpa-
bility in several important but sometimes quite idiosyncratic ways.  Indeed, in 
its discussion of the significance of youth, the Miller Court not only reiterated 
the key findings of Graham,
88
 it also highlighted an additional age-related 
consideration: the fact that many juvenile offenders come from “chaotic and 
abusive” households
89
 and “lack the ability to extricate themselves from hor-
rific, crime-producing settings.”
90
  The Court observed of Miller himself, 
“[I]f ever a pathological background might have contributed to a 14-year-
old’s commission of a crime, it is here.”
91
  The Court concluded that “a sen-
  
 86. Id. at 2471. 
 87. The Court’s underlying reasoning may echo that of Rita v. United States, in 
which the Court held that federal appellate courts may accord a presumption of rea-
sonableness to sentences imposed within the range recommended by the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.  551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007).  In justifying this decision, the 
Court observed:  
[B]y the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on 
review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have 
reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case.  
That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sen-
tence is a reasonable one. 
Id. at 347 (emphasis in original).  Similarly, when there is a “double determination” 
by both the legislature and the sentencing judge that an LWOP sentence is warranted 
in a particular case, there is a greater likelihood that the sentence is reasonable (that is, 
not disproportionate) than if there is only a single determination by the legislature.  Id. 
 88. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65. 
 89. Id. at 2468. 
 90. Id. at 2464 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 91. Id. at 2469. 
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tencer needed to examine all these circumstances before concluding that life 
without any possibility of parole was the appropriate penalty.”
92
   
Miller thus suggested that (1) juvenile status may sometimes function as 
a sort of “super-mitigator” that diminishes culpability in some cases in more 
than one way, and (2) that because this is a sufficiently common occurrence 
in cases of juvenile homicide, mandatory LWOP creates an unacceptably 
high risk of proportionality error.
93
  Read this way, Miller’s skepticism of 
mandatory sentencing may be limited – at least in its strongest form – to cases 
presenting mitigating circumstances that have an especially profound and 
idiosyncratic character, such as juvenile status. 
Finally, the Miller rule may be a further reflection of the Court’s special 
concerns regarding LWOP and permanent social exclusion.  Because LWOP 
is so disfavored, the Court demands a double procedural safeguard: a legisla-
ture must authorize the penalty and a sentencing judge with discretion must 
choose to impose it.
94
  Indeed, Miller arguably went beyond even Graham in 
its treatment of LWOP as an extreme penalty.  While Graham observed that 
“life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentenc-
es,”
95
 it also reaffirmed that “a death sentence is unique in its severity and 
irrevocability.”
96
  Miller, however, seemed to up the rhetorical ante in     
analogizing LWOP to death, asserting that the Court now “view[s juvenile 
LWOP] as akin to the death penalty.”
97
  Indeed, the “correspondence” be-
tween the two punishments was central to the Court’s ban on mandatory ju-
venile LWOP, for it made “relevant” the line of Eighth Amendment decisions 
requiring individualized sentencing when the state seeks to impose its “harsh-
est penalties.”
98
 
To the extent that a heightened concern over the severity of the penalty 
drove Miller’s rejection of mandatory sentencing, it is possible that the con-
  
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 2467-68 (“Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a 
sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics 
and circumstances attendant to it.  Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive 
the same sentence as every other – the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter 
and the accomplice, the child from the stable household and the child from a chaotic 
and abusive one.”).  The sensibility here may reflect a view that, in at least some cases 
of juvenile crime, society has failed in terribly profound ways in its responsibilities to 
the child, and society must in some sense hold itself to account in these cases, even as 
it holds the child to account; it would be hypocritical for society not to recognize in 
some meaningful way its own contribution to the offense. 
 94. See id. at 2475.  
 95. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  
 96. Id.  
 97. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 98. Id. at 2467-68. 
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cern was limited to juvenile LWOP specifically rather than LWOP generally.  
In Graham, the Court’s extended discussion of the severity of LWOP made 
comparatively little mention of the specifics of juvenile status.
99
  Although 
the Court noted – albeit almost in passing and near the end of the discussion – 
that LWOP is “an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile” because “a 
juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage 
of his life in prison than an adult offender,”
100
 the central point for purposes 
of the Court’s holding was simply that “life without parole is the second most 
severe penalty permitted by law.”
101
  In Miller, however, the Court more 
prominently and starkly drew the difference between juvenile and adult 
LWOP.
102
  Additionally, throughout its discussion of the severity of LWOP 
the Court always included the word “juvenile” in its characterization of the 
type of sentence at issue.
103
 
Although it is possible that the peculiar nature of juvenile LWOP played 
a crucial role in Miller’s rejection of mandatory sentencing, nothing in the 
Court’s opinion casts doubt on the notion that LWOP generally should be 
regarded as highly disfavored under Eighth Amendment analysis.  Indeed, 
such a stance would not be at all inconsistent with the view that juvenile 
LWOP should be even more disfavored than adult LWOP.   
Moreover, Miller offered an intriguing suggestion that may have an im-
portant bearing on the way courts should view the severity of adult LWOP:  
 
Although adults are subject as well to the death penalty in many 
jurisdictions, very few offenders actually receive that sentence.  
So in practice, the sentencing schemes at issue here result in ju-
venile homicide offenders receiving the same nominal punish-
ment as almost all adults, even though the two classes differ 
significantly in moral culpability and capacity for change.
104
 
 
The Court thus indicated that the dramatic, long-term decline in the fre-
quency of the imposition and execution of death sentences in the United 
  
 99. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027-28. 
 100. Id. at 2028. 
 101. Id. at 2027 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Compare id. at 2028 (“[A] juvenile offender will on average serve more 
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” (emphasis 
added)), with Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (“[A juvenile] will almost inevitably serve 
‘more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.’”  
(emphasis added) quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028)).  
 103. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466-67.  Elsewhere in this Symposium, however, Wil-
liam Berry argues persuasively that “the distinction between a juvenile LWOP sen-
tence and a life-without-parole sentence is not of great significance.”  William W. 
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1084 (2013). 
 104. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 n.7 (citation omitted). 
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States since the 1990s
105
 has relevance for the constitutionality of less severe 
sentences.  As a result, we may soon need to start regarding LWOP not as the 
second-most severe penalty in our punishment system, but as the de facto 
most severe penalty – a perspective that has important implications for the 
sort of categorical-proportionality analysis embraced by Graham.  
C.  Synthesis 
Graham and Miller’s prophylactic rules seem premised on the belief that 
juvenile offenders normally have diminished culpability relative to adult of-
fenders and should therefore receive lesser punishments for the same crimes.  
Yet this principle, standing alone, does not seem to fully capture the sensibili-
ties that animate the opinions.  First, the opinions attend to deference consid-
erations; it is not clear, for instance, that the cases would come out as they did 
without the Court’s findings of legislative inadvertence.  Additionally, the 
prophylactic rules are hard to account for in the absence of particular reserva-
tions about LWOP and mandatory sentencing. 
Given their uncertainties and equivocations, it is foolhardy to claim that 
Graham and Miller establish anything as formal and definite as a new “test” 
for Eighth Amendment claims.  But one may discern in the two opinions the 
outlines of a multifaceted heuristic of sorts.  Here, it seems, are the key fea-
tures of the Court’s approach.   
First, the core of the Eighth Amendment analysis is the culpability-
based, categorical proportionality review; in this review, the Court considers 
how far removed the offense is from the most serious offense (adult homi-
cide), and how far removed the sentence is from the harshest punishment (the 
death penalty).  If the sentence is categorically more severe than the offense, 
the sentence is at least presumptively unconstitutional, subject to the possibil-
ity that utilitarian crime-control benefits are sufficiently compelling as to 
outweigh the mismatch between culpability and punishment.   
Second, this proportionality review is conditioned by various deference-
related factors, including the frequency of the challenged sentence in practice, 
extent of deliberate legislative choice in favor of the sentence, and consisten-
cy of the sentence with international legal norms; the more convincingly 
these factors support deference, the less likely the Court will find that a sen-
tence fails proportionality review.  When, however, the case for deference is 
not particularly strong, the Court may conduct a more rigorous review analo-
gous to the heightened scrutiny sometimes performed in other areas of consti-
tutional law.
106
   
Third, proportionality review is also conditioned by a preference for the 
eventual social reintegration of all offenders; the Court will thus err against 
  
 105. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?, 
FED. SENT’G REP., Oct. 2010, at 4 (discussing death penalty data). 
 106. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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affirming an LWOP sentence, as it does the death penalty.
107
  For instance, 
the Court is more inclined to adopt a categorical prophylactic rule rather than 
leave proportionality concerns to case-by-case review.
108
   
Finally, the Court also disfavors mandatory sentencing and may      
overturn a mandatory LWOP regime even in the absence of a clear, categori-
cal mismatch between culpability and punishment (although this may be  
limited to situations involving certain sorts of super-mitigators or cases of 
juvenile LWOP). 
III.  MAKING SENSE OF HARMELIN AND EWING 
This Part considers whether the understanding of Graham and Miller 
sketched above can be reconciled with Ewing and Harmelin. 
A.  Ewing v. California 
In Ewing, the Court upheld the application of the California “Three 
Strikes and You’re Out” law to a repeat offender who received a sentence    
of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting.
109
  At first blush, upholding such   
a harsh sentence for such a minor offense seems hard to square with        
Graham’s robust proportionality review.
110
  Graham’s own proffered distinc-
tion is hardly satisfying: 
 
The approach in cases such as Harmelin and Ewing is suited for 
considering a gross proportionality challenge to a particular de-
fendant’s sentence, but here a sentencing practice itself is in 
question.  This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it 
applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a 
range of crimes.
111
 
 
  
 107. See Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, FED. SENT’G REP., Oct. 2010, 
at 49 (discussing the Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence, which has imposed 
various limitations on capital punishment based on the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause). 
 108. William Berry has a made a similar argument.  See William W. Berry III, 
More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1113 
(2010) (arguing “that ‘life without parole’ merits its own category of heightened re-
view in the application of the Eighth Amendment, requiring perhaps fewer categorical 
limitations than the death penalty but certainly greater protections” than in the pre-
Graham cases). 
 109. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 110. Ewing did not present, and the Court did not consider, a Miller-type        
procedural challenge to his sentence, so there seems no need to try to reconcile Ewing 
with Miller. 
 111. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010). 
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The Court’s lack of citation to precedent in this passage is telling, for the 
distinction between a challenge to a particular sentence and a challenge to a 
sentencing practice has no grounding in the Court’s earlier Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence on noncapital sentences.  There is, moreover, a good rea-
son why the Court had not previously made such a distinction: any challenge 
to a particular sentence can easily be reframed as a challenge to a sentencing 
practice, and there is no obvious basis for limiting such reframing.  For in-
stance, Ewing could have couched his attack on the California three-strikes 
law as a challenge to a “particular type of sentence” (twenty-five years to life) 
“as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of 
crimes” (from shoplifting to major violent offenses).
112
  Indeed, the Ewing 
plurality itself framed the question it confronted in sentencing-practice terms 
rather than particular-sentence terms, stating, “In this case we decide whether 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State of California from sentencing a 
repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the State’s ‘Three 
Strikes and You’re Out’ law.”
113
 
Nor does it seem very satisfying to distinguish the cases merely on the 
basis that one involved a juvenile defendant and the other an adult.  Recall 
that Graham’s sentence was unconstitutional because his case presented 
“twice diminished moral culpability”: once diminished for his juvenile status, 
and once again because he did not kill nor intend to kill.
114
  The proportion-
ality analysis of Graham thus requires analysis not only of the characteristics 
of the offender, but also of the nature of the offense.  There seems no good 
reason under Graham why the defendant who commits an extremely minor 
crime – like shoplifting – should not be regarded as having moral culpability 
that is also twice diminished.  A more persuasive basis for reconciling Ewing 
with Graham is provided by the multifaceted analysis described in Part II 
above, particularly by reference to the deference considerations and the 
Court’s aversion to LWOP and permanent social exclusion.   
1.  Conditioning Considerations 
The three deference considerations paramount in Graham were: (1) the 
infrequency of juvenile LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses, (2) legis-
lative inadvertence, and (3) the nearly universal international condemnation 
of juvenile LWOP.
115
  However, in Ewing the defendant did not urge any of 
these considerations and none of the considerations figured into the plurali-
ty’s analysis.  As to infrequency, the defendant’s brief noted in passing that 
only 1,346 defendants were sentenced under California’s three-strikes law for 
  
 112. See id. 
 113. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14. 
 114. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 115. See supra Part II.B. 
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minor property offenses,
116
 but nothing was made of this point and nothing in 
the Ewing Court’s various opinions indicates that any of the Justices focused 
on it.  Moreover, the 1,346 figure in Ewing is much higher than the 123 de-
fendants affected by Graham,
117
 which may itself supply a significant ground 
for distinguishing the cases.
118
 
Ewing made no claim of inadvertence at all, and the plurality found 
quite the opposite.  For instance, the plurality characterized the three-strikes 
law as “respon[sive] to widespread public concerns about crime,”
119
 and not-
ed that the California legislature “made a deliberate policy decision . . . that 
the gravity of the new felony should not be a determinative factor in trigger-
  
 116. Brief for Petitioner, Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (No. 01-6978), 2002 WL 1769930, 
at *16 (“[Three-strikers] were sentenced to twenty-five years to life for property 
crimes, including grand theft (108), petty theft with a prior (334), vehicle theft (217), 
receiving stolen property (164), forgery (58), and second degree burglary             
(455) . . . .”). 
 117. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024.  
 118. Indeed, the gap between Ewing and Graham in this regard is likely even 
more than simply 1,346 versus 123.  For one thing, the Ewing number came from 
only one state, while the Graham number was national.  Although the Ewing Court 
did not have before it much data on sentences actually imposed in other states, it is 
possible that the 1,346 figure would increase if such data were available.  See Ewing, 
538 U.S. at 45-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“With three exceptions, we do not have 
before us information about actual time served by Ewing-type offenders in other 
States. . . .  In nine . . . States, the law might make it legally possible to impose a sen-
tence of 25 years or more, though that fact by itself, of course, does not mean that 
judges have actually done so.” (citations omitted)).  Additionally, as Graham indicat-
ed, the number of defendants receiving a challenged sentence should be considered 
relative to the number of offenders who commit a relevant crime.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2024-25.  The number of juveniles who are arrested for serious violent crimes each 
year surely dwarfs the number of two-strikers arrested for minor property offenses, 
which makes the 1,346 figure seem comparatively even more impressive as an indica-
tor of relatively high frequency.  See id. at 2025 (noting tens of thousands of annual 
arrests of juveniles for aggravated assault, robbery, and other serious offenses); 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND 
YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 44, 49 (2001) (noting that about twenty-five percent of 
felony arrests in California in 1993 were attributable to juveniles, while only 4.3 per-
cent of arrestees in a sample of felony arrests that year had two strikes; of that small 
percentage of total felony arrestees, only 15.5 percent were arrested for non-burglary 
thefts).  To be sure, this may seem an unfair comparison because the three-strikes 
sentence in Ewing was nominally mandatory, while the juvenile LWOP sentences in 
Graham were discretionary.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 n.10 
(2012) (rejecting relevance of frequency of a mandatorily imposed sentence).  How-
ever, the California three-strikes sentence was only nominally a mandatory one.  
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17 (“Thus, [California] trial courts may avoid imposing a three 
strikes sentence in two ways: first, by reducing ‘wobblers’ to misdemeanors (which 
do not qualify as triggering offenses), and second, by vacating allegations of prior 
‘serious’ or ‘violent’ felony convictions.”). 
 119. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24. 
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ing the application of the Three Strikes Law.”
120
  This stands in marked con-
trast to the Graham Court’s finding that juvenile LWOP had not been adopted 
“through deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”
121
 
Finally, Ewing raised international views only in a footnote and, even 
then, made only a weak showing of international condemnation, citing legal 
standards in just two foreign jurisdictions.
122
  This falls far short of Graham’s 
finding that juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide offenses was a “sentencing 
practice rejected the world over,”
123
 a punishment imposed in only one nation 
across the entire globe (the United States), and a practice formally con-
demned in an international treaty “ratified by every nation except the United 
States and Somalia.”
124
 
To be sure, there is at least one sense in which Graham’s Eighth 
Amendment claim was actually more of a threat to deference ideals           
than Ewing’s: a judgment in Graham’s favor would effectively overturn      
the law in thirty-nine jurisdictions,
125
 whereas only twenty-five jurisdictions 
had three-strikes laws
126
 and an even smaller number of states would have 
authorized the sentence imposed on Ewing.
127
  Graham and Miller make 
clear, however, that legislative “nose counting” need not be a weighty      
consideration, particularly where there is evidence of legislative inadvert-
ence.
128
  Taking into account the full set of criteria that bear on the question, 
there seems ample ground for distinguishing Ewing from Graham on the def-
erence considerations. 
Lastly, one must take into account a final conditioning consideration: 
LWOP-aversion.  (Mandatoriness-aversion does not come into play because 
the sentencing judge did have discretion in Ewing’s case.
129
)  While the Cali-
fornia three-strikes sentence is certainly a long one, it does not embody the 
kind of permanent exclusion that Graham’s did, nor does it evoke the same 
sense of hopelessness.
130
  This too provides a seemingly important basis for 
explaining the Court’s different approaches in Graham and Ewing. 
  
 120. Id. at 30 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting James A. Ardaiz, Essay, Cali-
fornia’s Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 122. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at *38 n.32. 
 123. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033. 
 124. Id. at 2034. 
 125. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). 
 126. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15 (2003). 
 127. See id. at 46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In nine . . . States, the law might    
make it legally possible to impose a sentence of 25 years or more . . . .” (emphasis    
in original)). 
 128. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 129. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17. 
 130. To be sure, the dissenters in Ewing did assert that Ewing “will likely die in 
prison,” id. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but it is not clear what the basis for this 
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2.  Categorical-Proportionality Review 
One may get a better sense of the importance of the deference factors by 
considering whether Ewing is distinguishable from Graham on the basis of 
categorical-proportionality review alone.  This seems quite difficult; after all, 
if Graham’s offense was once-diminished because it did not involve death or 
an intent to cause death, surely Ewing’s was at least twice-diminished to the 
extent that it did not involve any physical injury of any kind, either caused or 
intended.  If one imagines a category comprised of the 1,346 “three-strikers” 
convicted of low-level property offenses, there is a very strong argument that 
an LWOP sentence could not be imposed on them consistent with the cate-
gorical-proportionality reasoning of Graham. 
Yet, it may nonetheless be possible to reconcile Ewing and Graham with 
respect to proportionality.  For one thing, Ewing did not receive an LWOP 
sentence; rather, he received a sentence of twenty-five years to life.
131
  This is 
not “the second most severe penalty permitted by law,” as Graham character-
ized LWOP
132
 – it may not even be thought of as the third most severe penal-
ty (it is possible, for instance, to imagine a parole-eligible life sentence with a 
materially longer minimum term than twenty-five years).   
Also important may be the criminal history that is necessary to trigger a 
three-strikes sentence.  Conventional theories of retributive proportionality 
recognize that it may be appropriate to treat repeat offending as more morally 
blameworthy than first-time offending: 
 
The first offender who is given a somewhat scaled-down pun-
ishment is censured for his act but nevertheless accorded some 
moral respect for the fact that his inhibitions against wrongdo-
ing appear to have functioned on prior occasions, and some 
sympathy or tolerance for the all-too-human frailty that can lead 
to such a lapse.
133
 
 
Although this perspective on proportionality may justify different de-
grees of punishment for low-level property offenders depending on whether 
they have a prior record, it remains unclear whether that prior record alone 
can bring a three-strikes sentence like Ewing’s within the range of minimally 
acceptable proportionality for a crime like shoplifting.  For one thing, crimi-
nal history is conceptualized here in terms of mitigation, not aggravation; that 
is, we have a justification for a first-timer discount, not a repeat-offender 
  
assertion was (beyond a vague reference to illness), and the plurality opinion did not 
characterize Ewing’s sentence in those terms. 
 131. Id. at 14.  
 132. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2012) (quoting Harmelin v. Mich-
igan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. Andrew von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT 659, 670 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
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enhancement.  However, this may be a distinction without a difference in the 
ordinal culpability analysis suggested by Graham.  It is possible that the of-
fense-based categorical distinctions – for instance, homicide versus nonhomi-
cide – may assume a first-time offender and recidivism may be thought of as, 
in some sense, canceling out one unit of culpability-diminution. 
Significant difficulties nonetheless remain for the proportionality of 
Ewing’s sentence.  Not all prior offenses seem capable of contributing to the 
blameworthiness of a new offense.  For instance, the further removed the 
priors are in time and nature from the current offense, the less material they 
seem to the severity of the current offense.
134
  Thus, Ewing’s prior “strikes” – 
three burglaries and a robbery occurring more than eight years before the 
shoplifting incident
135
 – might be seen as insufficiently recent or insufficient-
ly similar to the shoplifting to justify a materially harsher sentence than he 
would have received as a first-time offender.   
Finally, even if some incremental punishment was justified based on 
Ewing’s criminal history, there may be limits as to how much.  The loss-of-
mitigation theory does not justify continually harsher punishment on the basis 
of each new offense; at some point fairly early in the process – perhaps at the 
second or third offense (assuming they are all sufficiently close in time and 
character) – all available mitigation is lost and additional convictions no 
longer enhance culpability.
136
  It is certainly possible to see shoplifting as so 
categorically removed from a twenty-five-to-life sentence that mere loss of 
mitigation cannot possibly cover the severity gap.
137
 
  
 134. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 167 
(2001) (“The fact, for instance, that someone now convicted of theft was convicted of 
wounding five years ago provides no good reason to impose a harsher punishment for 
the theft, since it provides no good reason to judge either the current offense or the 
offender more harshly.”). 
 135. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18-19. 
 136. DUFF, supra note 134, at 169. 
 137. The loss-of-mitigation theory has been the leading proposal for reconciling 
harsher sentences for recidivists with retributive ideals.  However, Julian Roberts has 
recently offered an alternative approach, the enhanced culpability model.  JULIAN V. 
ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND 
OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 67 (2008).  Based on research on public and offender atti-
tudes, Roberts argues that “a retributive account which wholly, or almost completely, 
ignores previous convictions violates fundamental, consensual reactions to punishing 
offenders.”  Id. at xi.  He asserts, “Previous convictions speak to the offender’s state 
of mind prior to the commission of the offence in the same way that premeditation 
reflects an individual more worthy of censure . . . .”  Id. at 67.  Although Roberts 
would give greater weight to prior convictions than would the loss-of-mitigation theo-
ry (especially past the first conviction or two, when mitigation runs out), it seems 
highly unlikely that Roberts’ approach would provide support for Ewing’s sentence.  
For one thing, Roberts insists that prior convictions must be given less weight than 
other considerations that speak more directly to the seriousness of the current offense: 
“The[] offender-related factors [like previous convictions] must be subordinate to the 
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Yet loss of mitigation may not be the only theory on which criminal his-
tory is relevant to proportionality.  Professor R.A. Duff, for instance, posits 
the existence of a class of highly dangerous recidivists who deserve very 
harsh treatment: 
 
By his persistent, serious criminal wrongdoing [an offender in 
this class] has made reconciliation – the maintenance or restora-
tion of civic fellowship – impossible.  He has disqualified him-
self from continued participation in the community’s normal 
life.  We can thus justly subject him to an extended, indeed if 
necessary life-long, period of imprisonment, both to protect 
others from his continuing depredations and as a proportionate 
  
offense factors within a retributive framework in which offence seriousness predomi-
nates.  Allowing offender variables to carry the same or more weight at sentencing 
would shift the focus of sentencing away from the offence to the offender.”  Id. at 89.  
Additionally, while Roberts would allow prior convictions to continue to increase 
sentence length even after mitigation has been lost, he would not give as much weight 
to later convictions as to the first ones.  See id. (“[T]he difference in culpability be-
tween a first offender and an individual with two priors is much greater than that 
which differentiates an offender with two from another with four priors.”).  Addition-
ally, Roberts would not treat all prior convictions the same, but would make distinc-
tions, for instance, based on how old the priors are and whether they were of the same 
character as the current offense.  Id. at 224.  Finally, Roberts believes that “recidivists 
should be allowed to credit efforts to desist against the elevated culpability ascribed to 
them at sentencing.”  Id. at 209.  Thus, Roberts disagrees with mechanical approaches 
to handling criminal history, such as that embodied in the three strikes law.  See id. at 
89 (“[T]he recidivist sentencing premium cannot be reduced to the progressive ascrip-
tion of a quantum of punishment for each prior; consideration of the offender’s previ-
ous convictions requires a more multidimensional approach . . . .”). 
   Youngjae Lee has also recently proposed a sort of enhanced culpability mod-
el for the “recidivism premium.”  Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Rela-
tional Account, 87 TEX. L. REV. 571, 571 (2009).  Lee sees the premium as an addi-
tional punishment for a type of omission liability, “the omission being [the recidi-
vist’s] failure to take steps to prevent himself from committing another crime.”  Id. at 
610.  Of course, even a first-time offender could be faulted for this sort of omission.  
What distinguishes the recidivist and merits greater blame is that a first conviction 
“should prompt a period of reflection on the part of offenders to determine how they 
ended up committing the prohibited act.”  Id. at 613.  However, there is at least one 
major practical problem with Lee’s approach: at the same time that a conviction sends 
a message that the offender should “organize her life in a way that steers clear of 
criminality,” id., the conviction also constricts, sometimes quite dramatically, the 
scope of life choices available to an offender, making a reflective and constructive 
self-reorganization of the offender’s life much more difficult, if not a near impossibil-
ity.  Lee recognizes this problem, but does not offer a clear solution.  Id. at 618-20.  In 
any event, Lee’s account, like that of Roberts, does not purport to justify a large recid-
ivist premium, but rather “places a ceiling on it.”  Id. at 618.  Indeed, Lee specifically 
identifies the California three-strikes law as one that “go[es] too far.”  Id. at 578. 
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punishment for his crime.  What makes it proportionate, al-
though it is very much more severe than the punishments im-
posed on other, nonpersistent offenders who committed crimes 
similar to his latest crime, is that his crime, as part of a pattern 
of persistent serious criminality, is categorically more serious 
than theirs.  In the context of that pattern, it is no longer a sin-
gle, isolated attack on others but a further stage in a continuing 
attack, a continuing campaign of attacks, on the community’s 
members and its central values.
138
 
 
While there may be some offenders sentenced under California’s three-
strikes law who could conceivably be placed into this category, it seems 
doubtful that Ewing himself could, for Professor Duff’s theory presupposes 
“persistent commission of crimes of serious violence against the person.”
139
  
Ewing’s crimes were, for the most part, offenses directed at property and not 
the person, which hardly seems a “campaign of attacks”
140
 on society’s cen-
tral values (at least as Professor Duff understands those values to be). 
Perhaps criminal history can do more work in the proportionality analy-
sis if it is linked to a character-based theory of culpability.  As discussed 
above, Graham contains language suggesting that character may play an im-
portant role in the culpability calculus.  However, the Court provides no clear 
sense of how this works outside the context of juveniles and perhaps others 
whose characters are similarly unsettled, such as the mentally ill.   
Indeed, what the Court has in mind for character-assessment may       
not differ much from the loss-of-mitigation theory.
141
  While one may initial-
ly feel a sense of “sympathy or tolerance” for all-too-familiar frailties,
142
 this 
does not imply progressively greater punishments as our sympathy runs out 
and is replaced by swelling indignation over a recidivist’s failure to get       
his character in order.  There is nothing in Graham that is inconsistent with 
this limited, dichotomous view of character’s relevance; that is, culpability 
either is or is not once diminished based on whether the instant offense seems 
the sort of isolated, otherwise explicable lapse with which all of us can       
  
 138. DUFF, supra note 134, at 172 (emphases in original).  It should be noted that, 
despite articulating this argument, Duff himself hardly embraces it, but instead con-
fesses that its harshness leaves him feeling “uneasy.”  Id. at 172-73. 
 139. Id. at 170. 
 140. See id. at 172 (emphasis omitted). 
 141. Cf. Allan Manson, The Search for Principles of Mitigation: Integrating Cul-
tural Demands, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 40, 57 (Julian V. 
Roberts ed., 2011) (“Outside optimism and the ‘out of character’ assumption that we 
tend to apply to first offenders, there can be little room for mitigation based on char-
acter.  This is antagonistic both to proportionality and to equality of treatment.” (em-
phasis added)). 
 142. von Hirsch, supra note 133, at 670. 
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and should be able to identify.
143
  Among other advantages, this ap-       
proach saves proportionality analysis from the considerable practical and 
theoretical difficulties of engaging in a more open-ended assessment of        
the offender’s character.
144
 
In the end, there remains enough uncertainty in the categorical-
proportionality analysis that one cannot rule out the possibility that Ewing’s 
sentence might pass muster.  Still, in light of the great disparity between Gra-
ham’s violent, armed burglary and Ewing’s attempt at shoplifting, the argu-
ment hardly seems compelling that categorical-proportionality considerations 
alone can distinguish the results in the two cases.
145
  These proportionality 
  
 143. Indeed, it may be best to read all of the discussion in Graham of the signifi-
cance juvenile status for character as really simply establishing that all juveniles qual-
ify per se for a “first-timer” discount, that is, recidivism may not be used against a 
juvenile in the Eighth Amendment analysis as a justification for a harsher sentence 
than would otherwise be permissible.  See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).  
Consistent with this view, the Graham Court gave no apparent weight to the fact that 
Graham himself was a recidivist or any apparent consideration to the possibility of 
carving out repeat-offenders from its prophylactic rule.  See id. 
 144. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 134, at 168 (arguing against uses of criminal 
history at sentencing that would “involve an improper intrusion into [the offender’s] 
general moral character . . . .”); Andrew Ashworth, Re-evaluating the Justifications 
for Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT 
SENTENCING, supra note 141, at 29 (“The question is whether the sentencing process 
is properly expected to incorporate a balance sheet of all the good and bad deeds of 
the offender in social, family, and community circles.  The principled answer is that it 
should not be so expected: a court should take account of previous convictions or 
absence of convictions, and of aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to harm 
and culpability, but it is neither appropriate nor always possible for it to attempt this 
wider exercise in social accounting.”); Huigens, supra note 34, at 109 (“We might 
commit the question of fault to the jury in the form of a free-ranging inquiry into the 
quality of the defendant's practical reasoning, as exhibited in his wrongdoing.  If we 
did this, however, we would raise some difficulties that are unrelated to the nature of 
fault, but that impose some important limits on how fault is to be adjudicated.  These 
difficulties fall under the heading of the principle of legality.”).  
 145. In this proportionality analysis, I’ve emphasized a culpability-based ap-
proach.  However, the Ewing plurality itself invoked more instrumental considera-
tions in rejecting the claim that Ewing’s sentence was unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate.  See Ewing v. Cal., 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (“[Ewing’s sentence] reflects a 
rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have commit-
ted serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapaci-
tated. . . .  Ewing’s is not the rare cases in which a threshold comparison of the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionali-
ty.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Graham accepted that 
incapacitation might play a role in the proportionality analysis, see 130 S. Ct. at 2029 
(characterizing incapacitation as a “legitimate reason for imprisonment”), but also 
expressed concern that “[i]ncapacitation cannot override all other considerations lest 
the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.” Id.  
Indeed, the Court recognized that Graham should be incapacitated for a period of 
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difficulties underscore the importance of the conditioning considerations.  
Comparing the plurality opinion in Ewing with the opinion in Graham, it is 
hard to avoid the impression that the former employed a sort of rational basis 
review, while the latter – whether due to the influence of infrequency, legisla-
tive inadvertence, international condemnation, LWOP-avoidance, or some 
combination of the four – engaged in a more rigorous form of scrutiny. 
B.  Harmelin v. Michigan 
Because it involved an LWOP sentence and because that sentence was 
mandated by statute, Harmelin seems factually closer to Graham – and even 
more so to Miller – than Ewing was and is therefore more difficult to recon-
cile with the recent decisions.  This Section first considers how Harmelin 
relates to Graham, and then attempt to reconcile Harmelin with Miller. 
1.  Reconciling Harmelin with Graham 
As to conditioning considerations, legislative deliberateness may best 
distinguish Graham from Harmelin.  In contrast to the Graham Court’s con-
cerns regarding inadvertence, Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Har-
melin emphasized the high quality of the Michigan legislature’s work in 
adopting the “650 lifer law,” which mandated LWOP for possession of more 
than 650 grams of cocaine.
146
  Justice Kennedy elaborated, “This system is 
not an ancient one revived in a sudden or surprising way; it is, rather, a recent 
enactment calibrated with care, clarity, and much deliberation to address a 
most serious contemporary problem.”
147
  Additionally, and also in contrast 
with Graham, the Harmelin Court did not note and the defendant did not urge 
any inconsistency between the 650 lifer law and international legal norms.
148
  
  
time, see id. (“Graham deserved to be separated from society for some time in order 
to prevent what the trial court described as an ‘escalating pattern of criminal con-
duct.’” (citation omitted)), but simply saw the extent of the incapacitation as unjusti-
fied.  Id.  Yet, it is hard to see how Ewing’s long-term incapacitation was more justi-
fied than Graham’s, especially in light of the nonviolent nature of his offense; the 
general difficulties with predicting dangerousness accurately several years down the 
road even with the most carefully constructed models is shown in Paul H. Robinson & 
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 464-66 (1997).  Addi-
tionally, the over-inclusiveness of the California three-strikes law is well-documented 
in ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 118, at 58-61.     
 146. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1007-08 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 147. Id.  
 148. See Brief of Petitioner, Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (No. 89-7272), 1990 WL 
515104.  In other respects, though, deference considerations do not so clearly differ-
entiate Graham from Harmelin.  For instance, the numbers of offenders receiving the 
sentences at issue may not have differed much.  As of 2009, eighteen years after 
Harmelin, the number of offenders sentenced under the 650 lifer law was still only 
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It is not surprising, then, that the controlling opinion in Harmelin emphasized 
deference as a central value in its analysis
149
 and expressly used the language 
of rational-basis review.
150
 
Harmelin is also distinguishable from Graham in the categorical-
proportionality analysis.  Although both cases involved nonhomicide crimes 
and presented “once diminished” culpability on that basis, Harmelin did not 
offer as clear a ground as Graham for further diminution.  Harmelin had no 
prior felony convictions,
151
 but this does not necessarily count as mitigating; 
as suggested in the analysis of Ewing above,
152
 it may make more sense to 
think of a first offense as the baseline condition in the culpability analysis and 
criminal history as aggravating.   
There is another possibility: perhaps Harmelin’s crime was so minor that 
the culpability must be considered more than just once diminished.  After all, 
his drug offense was not merely a nonhomicide crime, it was also seemingly 
nonviolent; we have no reason to think that Harmelin caused or intended to 
cause any sort of physical injury to any person in connection with his drug-
dealing.  However, the controlling opinion in Harmelin was expressly prem-
ised on the belief that the possession of 650 grams of cocaine could in some 
meaningful sense be characterized as violent: 
 
Petitioner was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams 
(over 1.5 pounds) of cocaine.  This amount of pure cocaine has 
a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses.  From 
any standpoint, this crime falls in a different category from the 
relatively minor, nonviolent crime at issue in Solem [v. Helm].  
Possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent one 
of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our 
  
about 200.  Rethinking the “Lifer Law,” CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 10:14 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500164_162-49670.html.  Nor is it likely that many 
offenders like Harmelin were serving LWOP sentences in other states at the time; 
only Alabama then made LWOP available as a sentence for a first-time drug offender, 
and even then only for quantities much higher than Michigan’s 650-gram threshold.  
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting).  As for legislative support in other 
jurisdictions, only one other state besides Michigan authorized LWOP for first-time 
drug offenders, id. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting), which stands in marked contrast to 
the majority of states authorizing LWOP in the circumstances at issue in Graham.  
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (“Thirty-seven States as well as the District of Co-
lumbia permit sentences of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender in 
some circumstances.”). 
 149. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 150. Id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring and concurring in the judgment) (“Simi-
larly, a rational basis exists for Michigan to conclude that petitioner’s crime is as 
serious and violent as the crime of felony murder without specific intent to kill . . . .”). 
 151. Id. at 994. 
 152. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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population.  Petitioner’s suggestion that his crime was nonvio-
lent and victimless, echoed by the dissent, is false to the point 
of absurdity. . . . 
 
[T]he Michigan Legislature could with reason conclude that the 
threat posed to the individual and society by possession of this 
large an amount of cocaine – in terms of violence, crime, and 
social displacement – is momentous enough to warrant the de-
terrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole. . . . 
[A] rational basis exists for Michigan to conclude that petition-
er’s crime is as serious and violent as the crime of felony mur-
der without specific intent to kill, a crime for which no sentence 
of imprisonment would be disproportionate.
153
 
 
Given this premise – that possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine 
is analogous to felony murder for culpability purposes – and the absence of 
juvenile status or any other categorical basis for diminishing culpability, 
Harmelin’s sentence is not inconsistent with the logic of Graham. 
2.  Reconciling Harmelin with Miller 
Harmelin involved not merely an LWOP sentence, but a mandatory 
LWOP sentence.  Moreover, Harmelin – unlike Ewing – presented not only a 
substantive, Graham-type challenge to his sentence, but also a procedural, 
Miller-type claim.  The affirmance of Harmelin’s sentence thus seems to be 
in real tension with Miller’s rejection of a mandatory LWOP regime.   
Despite this tension, there are at least four plausible (and not mutually 
exclusive) possibilities for reconciling the cases.  First, the “care, clarity, and 
much deliberation” underlying the 650 lifer law contrasts with the legislative 
inadvertence found by the Court in Miller and seemingly demands a higher 
level of deference.  Second, there is the “super-mitigator” theory suggested 
above
154
: juvenile status may trigger special concerns regarding mandatory 
sentencing that were not present in Harmelin.  Third, also suggested above, 
the Miller Court may intend to distinguish juvenile LWOP as a more severe 
and disfavored penalty than LWOP generally.
155
 
Finally, there is the intriguing suggestion in Miller that the declining use 
of the death penalty has altered the way LWOP should be viewed for Eighth 
Amendment purposes.
156
  Miller noted that, even among adults convicted of 
homicide, “very few offenders actually receive” the death penalty, which 
  
 153. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 154. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 155. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 156. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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results in “juvenile homicide offenders receiving the same nominal punish-
ment as almost all adults, even though the two classes differ significantly in 
moral culpability and capacity for change.”
157
   
However, the American death penalty was in a considerably more robust 
state in 1991 when Harmelin was decided, which meant that LWOP could 
more appropriately be characterized as the second-most severe penalty in the 
American criminal-justice system.
158
  Today, with LWOP looking increasing-
ly like our most severe penalty, Harmelin would present an analogous culpa-
bility-mismatch problem to that highlighted by the Miller Court: since LWOP 
has become de facto the harshest penalty imposed in homicide cases, the crit-
ical homicide-nonhomicide distinction is blurred when LWOP is permitted in 
nonhomicide cases as well.  In other words, Harmelin may have been correct-
ly decided in light of circumstances as they existed in 1991, but Miller was 
also correctly decided in light of the changed circumstances regarding the 
death penalty that existed two decades later.  
IV.  APPLICATION TO 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) 
Thus far, I have suggested a more nuanced way of reconciling the 
Eighth Amendment cases than through a rigid juvenile-adult distinction.  My 
account of the cases provides room, at least in theory, for adults to challenge 
their LWOP sentences, either on substantive, Graham-type grounds or on 
procedural, Miller-type grounds.  However, my account does not suggest that 
adult LWOP sentences will always or even usually be unconstitutional.  Ra-
ther, the analysis turns on the particularities of the claim. 
In order to elucidate both the potential and the pitfalls of efforts to      
extend Graham and Miller to adults, this Part assesses the prospects for 
Eighth Amendment challenges to one mandatory LWOP regime established 
for certain drug offenders by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  The analysis first 
describes the statutory regime and identifies a class of offenders who might 
plausibly raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to the regime.  Next, the 
analysis separately considers the prospects for a Graham-type challenge and a 
Miller-type challenge.
159
 
  
 157. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 n.7 (2012). 
 158. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2010 –
STATISTICAL TABLES 18 tbl.14 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/cp10st.pdf (showing 268 death sentences imposed in 1991, as compared to 
only 104 in 2010; the number has steadily declined for more than a decade, and has 
been well below 268 every year since 1999). 
 159. I assume for purposes of this Part that federal courts should apply the same 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause analysis to federal sentences that the Supreme 
Court has developed in Graham and Miller for the review of state sentences.  Howev-
er, Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer has recently offered an interesting, historically 
based argument that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted differently when 
federal sentences are under review, specifically, through a requirement that “federal 
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A.  Framing the Hypothetical Eighth Amendment Claims 
Section 841(b)(1)(A) appears within a graduated sentencing scheme for 
drug-trafficking offenses.
160
  Quantity is a key consideration in this scheme, 
  
sentences be no stricter than state sentences for the same crime.”  Michael J. Zydney 
Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 74 
(2012).  As indicated in the Appendix to the present Article, few states authorize 
LWOP for drug offenses, which suggests that section 841(b)(1)(A) sentences might 
be subject to even stronger challenges under Mannheimer’s approach than my own. 
 160. The statute’s text is as follows: 
(b) Penalties 
. . . any person who violates subsection (a) of this section [prohibiting the 
manufacture of and trafficking in controlled substances] shall be sentenced as 
follows: 
(1)(A) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving – 
(i) 1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount of heroin; 
(ii) 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount of – 
(I) coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which co-
caine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed; 
(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers; 
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; or 
(IV) any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of 
any of the substances referred to in subclauses (I) through (III); 
(iii) 280 grams or more of a mixture or substance described in clause (ii) 
which contains cocaine base; 
(iv) 100 grams or more of phencyclidine (PCP) or 1 kilogram or more of a 
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP); 
(v) 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); 
(vi) 400 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount of N-phenyl-N- [ 1- ( 2-phenylethyl ) -4-piperidinyl ] propanamide or 
100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 
of any analogue of N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propan-
amide; 
(vii) 1000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount of marihuana, or 1,000 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight;  
(viii) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its 
isomers or 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detecta-
ble amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers; 
such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be 
less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury results 
from the use of such substance shall be not less than 20 years or more than life 
. . . .  If any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a fel-
ony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and not more than life im-
prisonment and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such 
substance shall be sentenced to life imprisonment . . . .  If any person commits 
a violation of this subparagraph . . . after two or more prior convictions for a 
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and § 841(b)(1)(A) deals with the highest-end quantities of drugs.  The basic 
sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A) is a ten-year mandatory minimum.
161
  Howev-
er, the statute also provides for various enhancements.  The provision of im-
mediate concern imposes a mandatory LWOP sentence if the defendant has 
“two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense.”
162
  This provision 
might thus be conceived as a sort of three-strikes law for drug offenders and, 
as a matter of convenience, this Part will refer to the provision this way. 
What seems most notable about the three-strikes law is its authorization 
of LWOP sentences for a class that I will call “drug-only” offenders; that     
is, offenders never convicted of a conventional violent or other non-drug 
crime and whose instant offense does not involve any proven actual injury, 
intent to injure, or threat of injury (except, of course, to the extent that      
drug use may be thought of as intrinsically injurious).  The drug-only offend-
er thus stands in marked contrast to the image of the hyperviolent gangster 
that figures so prominently in depictions of drug traffickers in popular culture 
and political rhetoric.   
The questions for consideration now are whether the Eighth Amendment 
permits LWOP sentences for drug-only offenders and, if so, whether such 
sentences may be imposed on a mandatory basis and without regard to any 
individualized mitigating circumstances the offender has to offer.
163
 
B.  Substantive Constitutionality: The Graham Claim 
The substantive Eighth Amendment claim would go something like this: 
the drug-only three-strikers have culpability that is at least twice diminished 
because they are not only free of the taint of homicide, but are also innocent 
of any violence.  Such multiple-diminution in culpability leaves them unfit 
for LWOP, which is no more than once diminished relative to the most severe 
penalty.  Before evaluating this categorical-proportionality argument, howev-
er, one should first assess the various conditioning considerations. 
1.  Conditioning Considerations 
a.  Deference 
Deference considerations provide little support for imposing LWOP on 
drug-only offenders.  Consider frequency of the sentence first.  Life sentences 
  
felony drug offense have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory term of life imprisonment without release . . . .  
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012).  
 161. Id.  
 162. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).   
 163. A few three-strikes defendants have already tried, without success, to raise 
Eighth Amendment claims similar to what I propose in lower courts.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Ousley, 698 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied. 133 S. Ct. 1480 (2013). 
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for drug trafficking offenses are hardly routine, although they may be more 
common than the juvenile LWOP sentences at issue in Graham and Miller.  
At the end of 2010, there were 2,472 defendants in federal prison on life 
terms for drug trafficking offenses.
164
  This is a substantial number, but it is 
only a small percent of the total 96,829 federal drug-trafficking inmates.  The 
disparity is even more marked in the annual sentencing data: out of 24,411 
federal drug-trafficking sentences imposed in 2010, only 124 were for life.
165
  
Of course, some of those sentences were likely based on death or violence 
considerations
166
 – considerations that are ruled out in our hypothetical claim 
challenging the application of § 841(b)(1)(A) to drug-only offenders.
167
   
  
 164. Federal sentencing statistics can be obtained on-line through the interactive 
research tool provide by the United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice 
Statistics.  See Fed. Justice Statistics Res. Ctr., The Federal Criminal Case Pro-
cessing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2013) (data available for the years 1998-2010).  Since parole release was 
abolished prospectively in the federal system by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1985), all or nearly all of the life terms being served 
today for drug offenses are likely of the LWOP variety.  See Fed. Justice Statistics 
Res. Ctr., supra. Note that not all of the 2,472 drug-trafficking lifers necessarily re-
ceived mandatory life terms, or were sentenced under the three-strikes provisions of § 
841(b)(1)(A).  See infra note 167.   
 165. See id.  
 166. Discretionary life sentences are authorized by section 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) for 
all drug-trafficking offenses that meet the quantity thresholds, and are required in 
some cases in which “death or serious bodily injury results from the use” of the traf-
ficked substance.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2012). 
 167. One analysis of federal sentences imposed from 1999 to 2012 provides some 
more precise insight into the frequency of LWOP for drug-only offenders.  Paul Hofer 
has compiled the relevant information from United States Sentencing Commission 
data.  Email from Paul Hofer, Policy Analyst, Federal Public and Community De-
fenders, to the Author (Jan. 26, 2014) (on file with the Missouri Law Review).  He 
finds 2,114 life sentences for drug offenders in all, and 828 receiving life terms who 
were convicted under statutory provisions that mandate LWOP.  Of the 828, at least a 
couple dozen seem clearly outside my drug-only category: twenty-nine were sen-
tenced under Part 2A of the federal sentencing guidelines, which deals with murder 
and other crimes against the person, and one received an adjustment for violence or 
credible threats of violence.  Additionally, Hofer’s data highlight a couple of gray-
area categories.  First, in eleven of the cases, there were indications that death or seri-
ous bodily injury resulted from the drug, even though Part 2A of the guidelines was 
not invoked.  It is likely that most or all of these cases involved accidental overdoses, 
and it is at least arguable that deaths of that sort are not sufficient to raise an offense 
into the highest culpability category.  Second, 264 of the offenders received an ad-
justment or conviction indicating the involvement of a weapon in the offense.  How-
ever, it appears that the great majority of these cases involved simple possession of a 
weapon, and not demonstrated brandishing or use.  Again, an argument could be 
made that these cases are best thought of as nonviolent, drug-only cases.   
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State-court sentences should also be considered to determine frequency.  
Pertinent state data are harder to obtain but appear consistent with the federal 
data.  For instance, one study estimated that only about sixteen percent –      
or approximately 11,000 – of the 70,000 lifers in the United States from 1988   
to 2001 are serving time for drug-trafficking offenses.
168
  However, the study 
did not distinguish between life with and without the possibility of parole.     
If the count were limited to true LWOP sentences, the number would surely 
be much lower, and would be smaller still if the count were limited to drug-
only offenders.   
Similar infrequency is also suggested by the felony sentencing data from 
large urban counties.  One study of 2006 data found that only forty-seven 
percent of convicted drug-trafficking defendants received any type of prison 
sentence.
169
  Moreover, among the minority of drug offenders receiving pris-
on sentences, the median length was only two years.
170
  Out of 1,568 prison 
sentences imposed for drug-trafficking felonies, not one was for life and only 
five were for more than ten years.
171
  These five lengthier sentences repre-
sented only about .06 percent of the felony defendants in the study who were 
arrested on drug-trafficking charges, even though a full fifty percent of ar-
restees had multiple prior convictions.
172
  In short, it seems safe to say that 
sentences approaching a life term in severity are an extraordinarily rare oc-
currence among even repeat drug-trafficking offenders.  Again, if we could 
effectively screen out those with records of violence, the numbers would 
probably look even more lopsided. 
In addition to infrequent imposition in practice, Graham and Miller also 
indicate that inadvertence in authorizing a challenged sentence may diminish 
the deference that would normally be shown to legislative policy choices.  At 
first blush, § 841 may look like the same sort of systematic, graduated, quan-
tity-driven drug-sentencing scheme that the Court approved in Harmelin.  
However, there is a difference insofar as the federal three-strikes law is keyed 
to prior drug convictions, including convictions obtained under the highly 
varied and dynamic drug laws of the fifty states.  There may be potential for 
three-strikers with relatively innocuous prior convictions – particularly those 
suffered under idiosyncratic state laws adopted after the three-strikes provi-
sion first appeared in 1986 – to assert inadvertence; that is, that their criminal 
histories were beyond Congress’s contemplation in approving § 841(b)(1)(A). 
Then, too, there is considerable evidence of legislative inadvertence in 
setting the threshold quantity levels in § 841(b)(1)(A).  Although Congress 
  
 168. See Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/02/national/02life. 
web.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 169. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, 12 tbl.12 (2010). 
 170. Id. at 13 tbl.13. 
 171. Id. at 27 app. tbl.10. 
 172. Id. at 5 tbl.4. 
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intended to target “major” traffickers with this provision, a 2011 study by the 
United States Sentencing Commission (the Commission) found no strong 
correlation between the quantity thresholds and actual drug-trafficking 
roles.
173
  The Commission concluded that its “analysis suggests that the man-
datory minimum penalties for drug offenses may apply more broadly than 
Congress may have originally intended.”
174
  The conclusion serves as a re-
minder that the § 841 mandatory minimums were adopted in 1986 in a fit of 
election-year, antidrug hysteria that developed in the wake of the cocaine-
related death of a college basketball star and without the benefit of committee 
hearings.
175
  Indeed, the new mandatory minimums preempted the sentencing 
guidelines system that Congress itself created just two years earlier.
176
  More-
over, one of the threshold quantities – that for crack cocaine – was subjected 
to intense, compelling criticism for many years, finally resulting in reform 
legislation in 2010.
177
  In short, it would be hard to say that the 1986 Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, as the controlling opinion in Harmelin said of the 650 lifer 
law, was “calibrated with care, clarity, and much deliberation . . . .”
178
 
Outside of the federal system, it appears that only twelve states author-
ize LWOP for drug-only offenders, which is considerably fewer than the   
thirty-nine states whose laws were overturned by Graham.
179
  International 
legal norms may also increasingly cut against LWOP.  For instance, most 
European nations have rejected LWOP as a sentencing option and those that 
permit the sentence use it quite sparingly.
180
  Moreover, pronouncements by 
various European legal authorities have cast considerable doubt on the     
legality of even limited uses of LWOP.
181
  Most recently, in July 2013 the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Vinter v. 
United Kingdom: 
 
  
 173. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 168-69 (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_
Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_PDF/Chapter_08.pdf. 
 174. Id. at 169. 
 175. TED GEST, CRIME AND POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT’S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN 
FOR LAW AND ORDER 116-22 (2001). 
 176. Id. at 121-22. 
 177. Ronald F. Wright, Portable Minimalism in Sentencing Politics, 2011 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 9, 15-17. 
 178. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1008 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 179. The Appendix provides a list of these twelve states along with relevant statu-
tory references. 
 180. Dirk Van Zyl Smit, Outlawing Irreducible Life Sentences: Europe on the 
Brink?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 39, 40-41 (2010). 
 181. Id. at 41-44. 
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[I]n the context of a life sentence, Article 3 [of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, barring “inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment”] must be interpreted as requiring re-
ducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review which allows 
the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the 
life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards reha-
bilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to 
mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on le-
gitimate penological grounds.
182
 
 
In sum, while the deference factors may not cut quite as strongly against 
the sentence at issue here as they did in Graham – in that the frequency of the 
sentence may be a bit higher, the legislative inadvertence less facially mani-
fest, and the contrary international norm less firmly established – the analogy 
to Graham may nonetheless be close enough to warrant some heightening of 
the judicial scrutiny of § 841(b)(1)(A).  These factors may also arguably 
serve to distinguish Harmelin, in which contrary international norms were not 
considered (and, for that matter, were not as well developed as they are now 
in light of Vinter and other recent decisions
183
) and in which the legislature 
was found to have acted with such care and deliberation. 
  
 182. Vinter v. U.K., Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 & 3896/10, HUDOC, para. 119 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/con-
tent/pdf/001-122664?TID=bnhdrclhla.  At the same time, the Grand Chamber did not 
indicate that the required review must be judicial, but expressly recognized the possi-
bility that executive review might comply with Article 3.  Id. at para. 120.  It is thus 
possible that U.S. LWOP sentences might be acceptable under the reasoning of Vinter 
based on the existence of a gubernatorial pardoning power.  Cf. id. at para. 55 (noting 
House of Lords decision suggesting as much).  However, a merely theoretical possi-
bility of executive clemency may be insufficient to save a life sentence.  For instance, 
in Vinter itself, the Grand Chamber found the system of whole-life sentences in Eng-
land and Wales to be in violation of Article 3 notwithstanding the government’s ar-
gument that the Secretary of State had legal authority to release even whole life pris-
oners when there was no longer any legitimate penological reason for holding them.  
Id. at para. 129.  The Grand Chamber found the “lack of clarity” about the availability 
of review and release to be unacceptable.  Id.  The court also indicated that it must be 
concerned with the law “as it is applied in practice to whole life prisoners.”  Id. at 
para. 126.  “[F]or a life sentence to remain compatible with Article 3, there must be 
both a prospect of release and a possibility of review.”  Id. at para. 110.  Clemency in 
some or most jurisdictions may fall short of these ideals.  Cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 301-03 (1983) (“Commutation . . . is an ad hoc exercise of executive clem-
ency.  A governor may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without refer-
ence to any standards. . . .  In South Dakota, commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. . . .  In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years.”). 
 183. Vinter supplies a lengthy summary of relevant European, international, and 
comparative law. 
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b.  Aversion to LWOP and Permanent Social Exclusion 
The Court’s aversion to LWOP – which stems from its sense that 
LWOP is not merely the endpoint on a continuum of sentences but is qualita-
tively different from any other prison term and is analogous in some respects 
to the death penalty – should support categorical, prophylactic rulings against 
three-strikes sentences under § 841(b)(1)(A) to the extent that the proportion-
ality analysis points to a significant likelihood that such sentences are exces-
sive.  There is language in Miller, and to a lesser extent Graham, suggesting 
that the Court’s LWOP-aversion is particularly strong as to juveniles.
184
  
However, this does not preclude the existence of heightened concerns regard-
ing adult LWOP, and a bright-line distinction in this area would be hard to 
justify.  The symbolic, moral significance of an LWOP sentence, with its 
categorical rejection of the possibility of reform and atonement, seems equal-
ly harsh at any age.
185
   
While the raw number of years served by a juvenile condemned            
to LWOP will, on average, be greater than the number of years served by         
an adult, a focus on number of years alone misses the significance of           
the Court’s treatment of LWOP as a qualitatively unique sentence.  Moreo-
ver, many adults convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A) may be relatively young     
themselves and still face decades of incarceration.
186
  It is not clear that    
there is a significant experiential difference between fifty years of hopeless-
ness and forty years of hopelessness, especially in light of the psychological 
literature on adjustment to prison, which indicates that the first year tends     
to be the hardest.
187
   
2.  Categorical Proportionality 
An analysis of the conditioning considerations suggests viability to our 
hypothetical Graham claim.  We have yet to determine, however, if there 
really is a categorical mismatch between the seriousness of the offense and 
the severity of the punishment.  Following Graham’s lead, this requires an 
  
 184. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 
S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 185. If we take seriously the analogy in Graham between the death penalty and 
the living death of LWOP, then age at time of the offense should not matter much –
the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence has never suggested that the death penalty is 
somehow a less severe penalty for constitutional purposes if it is imposed on an older 
person who has already had a good opportunity to enjoy life. 
 186. Most federal drug-trafficking defendants sentenced to life in prison are under 
age forty at the time of commitment, and a substantial minority is under age thirty.  
Fed. Justice Statistics Res. Ctr., supra note 164. 
 187. For a summary of the research, see John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and 
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1047-49 (2009).  
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assessment of both the culpability-diminution relative to adult homicide and 
the penalty-diminution relative to the death penalty. 
a.  Culpability-Diminution 
The greatest difficulty facing the Graham claim may be Harmelin and 
the controlling opinion’s treatment of high-volume drug trafficking as a sort 
of violent crime analogous in its severity to felony murder.  Indeed, the invo-
cation of felony murder, with its implicit determination of extreme reckless-
ness relative to human life,
188
 suggests that the § 841(b)(1)(A) three-strikers 
may not even have once diminished culpability.  On the other hand, extreme 
recklessness is not quite the same thing as intent to kill, and in other Eighth 
Amendment settings the Court rejected the proposition that all felony mur-
derers should be indiscriminately categorized with the worst of the worst.
189
  
Let us assume, then, that drug-only offenders have a level of culpability that 
is at least once diminished. 
Further diminution seems problematic; again, the controlling opinion in 
Harmelin squarely rejected the defendant’s argument that his crime was non-
violent.
190
  Of course, there may be some drug-only three-strikers who are 
juveniles or who otherwise possess characteristics that categorically diminish 
culpability, such as mental retardation or severe mental illness.
191
  These sub-
classes of three-strikers might be able to establish categorical disproportional-
ity even if others could not.  However, if one focuses on just unimpaired, 
adult three-strikers, Harmelin presents a real difficulty. 
There are at least two plausible responses to the Harmelin problem (in 
addition, of course, to the possibility that Harmelin may be distinguished on 
the basis of the deference considerations).  First, the controlling opinion’s 
treatment of high-volume cocaine-trafficking as a crime of violence may have 
  
 188. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (2013) (“Such recklessness and [ex-
treme] indifference [to the value of human life] are presumed if the actor is engaged 
or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit [one of several listed felonies].”). 
 189. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (“[I]t is for us ultimately to 
judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one 
such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is com-
mitted by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing 
take place or that lethal force will be employed.  We have concluded, along with most 
legislatures and juries, that it does not.”). 
 190. It should be noted that, Harmelin notwithstanding, there are serious questions 
as to whether and under what circumstances drug dealing can be considered the sort 
of public wrong that warrants any criminal punishment.  Michael M. O’Hear, Drug 
Treatment Courts as Communicative Punishment, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: 
HAS IT A FUTURE? 234, 246-47 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
 191. Elsewhere in this Symposium, William Berry discusses a number of the 
offender characteristics that might be analogized to juvenile status.  William W. Berry 
III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1077 (2013). 
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been premised on the particular social realities of 1991.  The late 1980s and 
early 1990s were indeed an extraordinarily violent time in American history, 
and much of the violence was particularly associated with the distribution of 
crack cocaine.
192
  Public fears led Congress to adopt a draconian new sen-
tencing regime for crack in 1986 and to make it even harsher in 1988.
193
  
Indeed, the Harmelin controlling opinion made much of the contemporary 
data establishing what it labeled a “direct nexus between illegal drugs and 
crimes of violence.”
194
  
The world, however, has changed since 1991.  The crack epidemic abat-
ed
195
 and criminal violence more generally plummeted.
196
  In public opinion 
surveys, mentions of drugs as the nation’s top problem peaked in 1990       
and then fell dramatically.
197
  Thus, while the dangerousness of cocaine traf-
ficking in 1991 may have warranted the Court’s treatment of the offense as    
a violent one, the experience of the ensuing two decades may have under-
mined the factual basis of the Court’s decision.  Certainly, there seems    
nothing inherently violent about trafficking in addictive psychoactive sub-
stances – for example, one does not think of Starbucks, Anheuser-Busch, or 
Philip Morris as violent organizations, despite what one may think about the 
products they peddle.   
What makes drug dealing arguably a violent activity is the particular so-
cial circumstances in which it takes place; if those circumstances change, then 
our evaluation of the violent character of the activity may also change.  In 
that sense, a reaffirmation of the legal principles articulated by the Harmelin 
controlling opinion does not necessarily imply that the Court would or should 
adhere to the view that possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine today is 
the moral equivalent of a serious crime of violence like felony murder. 
Second, even if the Court continues to believe that the specific drug 
crime at issue in Harmelin remains properly characterized as violent, that 
would not necessarily justify a similar characterization for all of the drug 
offenses covered by § 841(b)(1)(A); there might be subclasses of § 
841(b)(1)(A) offenders who can claim protection under Graham, even if the 
cocaine offenders cannot.  After all, the controlling opinion in Harmelin itself 
carefully qualified its conclusions based on the dangers associated with “this 
  
 192. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 81 (2007) 
(quoting Alfred Blumstein, The Recent Rise and Fall of American Violence, in THE 
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 1, 39 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000)). 
 193. GEST, supra note 175, at 120-22. 
 194. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring the judgment). 
 195. ZIMRING, supra note 192, at 75. 
 196. Id. at 5-7. 
 197. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL FOR THE 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE NSCS SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY: 
A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 13 (2006), available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/ 
cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/132. 
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large an amount of cocaine.”
198
  A different amount of a different drug might 
call for a much different analysis.   
For instance, § 841(b)(1)(A) mandates LWOP for three-strikers who 
manufacture or distribute 1,000 kilograms of any mixture containing a detect-
able amount of marijuana or 1,000 marijuana plants regardless of weight.
199
  
Marijuana is, of course, quite a different drug than cocaine – it is consumed 
much more frequently by Americans and is not particularly associated with 
violence and some of the other pathologies associated with so-called hard 
drugs.
200
  Indeed, twenty states and the District of Columbia have approved 
its use for medical purposes,
201
 two states recently legalized its recreational 
use,
202
 various other jurisdictions are known for high levels of official tolera-
tion,
203
 and fifty percent of Americans support its legalization.
204
  Given this 
degree of social acceptance, it is a mistake to assume uncritically that Har-
melin’s characterization of cocaine trafficking as a violent crime would or 
should also apply to marijuana trafficking.
205
  It is possible that similar dis-
tinctions could also be made with respect to LSD, another drug that is cov-
ered by § 841(b)(1)(A). 
Even as to some of the harder drugs on the § 841(b)(1)(A) list, the quan-
tity thresholds may be too low to justify equation with the quantity of cocaine 
at issue in Harmelin, a quantity that the controlling opinion assumed to be 
  
 198. 501 U.S. at 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). 
 199. For information about a number of individuals currently serving LWOP 
sentences for nonviolent marijuana offenses, although not necessarily sentenced under 
the law at issue here, see LIFE FOR POT: RELEASE NON-VIOLENT MARIJUANA 
PRISONERS, http://www.lifeforpot.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
 200. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE 
SCIENCE BASE 95, 125-27 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999). 
 201. Monique Garcia & John Keilman, It Could Be Next Fall Before First Pot 
Clinics Open, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-
02/news/chi-quinn-to-sign-medical-marijuana-bill-thursday-20130731_1_pot-stores-
medical-marijuana-card-law. 
 202. See NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF 
SENTENCING 2012: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 3 (2013), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sen_State%20of%20Sentencing%20201
2.pdf (noting legalization in Colorado and Washington). 
 203. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Marijuana, Not yet Legal for Californians, 
Might as Well Be, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/12/21/us/politics/stigma-fading-marijuana-common-in-california.html?page 
wanted=1&_r=0. 
 204. Frank Newport, Record-High 50% of Americans Favor Legalizing Marijua-
na Use, GALLUP POL. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150149/record-
high-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx. 
 205. Marijuana may also be distinguishable from other drug offenses by reference 
to the deference considerations.  For instance, only nine states authorize LWOP for 
marijuana offenses.  See infra Appendix. 
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capable of producing upwards of 65,000 doses.
206
  For instance, the threshold 
for methamphetamine is only fifty grams
207
 with common abuse dosages in 
the range of 0.1 to one gram per day.
208
  This suggests a wide disparity rela-
tive to the volume of cocaine assumed to be at issue in Harmelin. 
Thus, there are plausible grounds for distinguishing Harmelin with re-
spect to offense severity – on the basis of changed social circumstances since 
1991, or on the basis of differences between some of the specific offenses 
covered by § 841(b)(1)(A) and Harmelin’s offense – and thereby finding a § 
841(b)(1)(A) offense diminished in culpability relative to homicide.  Howev-
er, an additional difficulty remains for the Graham claim: the three-strikes 
provision at issue requires the presence of a criminal history, which is rele-
vant to proportionality under Ewing.   
On the other hand, Ewing does not indicate that all criminal history 
should be treated as equally grave or that the existence of some criminal his-
tory automatically opens up any possible sentence, no matter how severe.  To 
the contrary, Ewing left intact the Court’s earlier decision in Solem v. Helm, 
in which the Court overturned an LWOP sentence for a minor offense not-
withstanding the defendant’s extensive history of prior convictions.
209
  Thus, 
the Ewing plurality did not declare that prior convictions per se justified a 
sentence of twenty-five years to life, but instead emphasized the particulari-
ties of Ewing’s “long, serious criminal record.”
210
 
It may thus be possible for some § 841(b)(1)(A) three-strikers to show 
that their criminal histories are distinguishable from Ewing’s.  The Ewing 
plurality emphasized that the state “was entitled to place upon Ewing the onus 
of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms 
prescribed by the criminal law of the State.”
211
  This echoes the concern in 
Graham and Miller with whether a defendant has shown “evidence of irre-
trievable depravity.”
212
  In order to offset culpability-diminution, a criminal 
history may need to be sufficiently grave so as to justify a conclusion along 
the lines of what the plurality reached in Ewing. 
Given the breadth of criminal history that may trigger mandatory LWOP 
under § 841(b)(1)(A), there may well be many cases that fall short of a 
Ewing-type record under the statute.  Consider the plurality’s characterization 
  
 206. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 207. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2012).  
 208. Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets: Methamphetamine (and Am-
phetamine), NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/People/ 
injury/research/job185drugs/methamphetamine.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).  
 209. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 210. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (plurality opinion).  
 211. Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 212. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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of this record: “Ewing has been convicted of numerous misdemeanor and 
felony offenses, served nine separate terms of incarceration, and committed 
most of his crimes while on probation or parole.  His prior ‘strikes’ were seri-
ous felonies including robbery and residential burglaries.”
213
  By contrast, a § 
841(b)(1)(A) three-striker need not have nine prior terms of incarceration; 
indeed, it is possible to trigger mandatory LWOP without any prior term of 
incarceration.  Likewise, a § 841(b)(1)(A) three-striker need not commit any 
offenses while on probation or parole.  Finally, a § 841(b)(1)(A) three-striker 
need not have committed any prior offenses where the gravity approaches 
that of robbery, a violent crime, or residential burglary – any felony drug 
offense from any state counts, regardless of how draconian or idiosyncratic a 
state’s drug laws are.   
For instance, in United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, the defendant’s 
strikes were all for the crime of simple possession.
214
  In United States v. 
Millard, a defendant’s LWOP sentence was based, in part, on a prior convic-
tion in Iowa for the crime of sponsoring a gathering with knowledge that a 
controlled substance would be distributed, used, or possessed at the gather-
ing.
215
  Crimes such as these are not persuasive evidence of “irretrievable 
depravity”
216
 or a “simpl[e inability] to bring [one’s] conduct within the so-
cial norms prescribed by the criminal law of the State.”
217
 
More generally, as indicated above, the loss-of-mitigation theory of 
criminal history indicates that prior convictions are most relevant when they 
are recent and involve crimes that are similar to the current offense.
218
  Simi-
larly, crimes that are too closely connected with one another may also lack 
independent moral significance.  Yet the crude strike-counting mechanism of 
§ 841(b)(1)(A) does not take into account any of these considerations.  For 
instance, in United States v. Beckstrom, the Tenth Circuit indicated that two 
prior convictions could count against a defendant even though both were part 
of a single continuing course of conduct.
219
  Likewise, in United States v. 
Hudacek the defendant received a mandatory life term based on a twenty-
year-old prior conviction.
220
  In sum, even though some § 841(b)(1)(A) three-
strikers may have criminal histories that bear on culpability in important 
ways, there are other identifiable subclasses or individual defendants whose 
records are quite distinguishable from Ewing’s and do not provide a convinc-
ing basis for enhancing culpability. 
  
 213. Ewing, 538 U.S at 30 (plurality opinion). 
 214. 617 F.3d 581, 609 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 215. 139 F.3d 1200, 1209 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 216. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cit- 
ation omitted). 
 217. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 284 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 218. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 219. 647 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 220. 24 F.3d 143 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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Criminal history may come into play in the Eighth Amendment analysis 
by a route other than culpability-assessment.  Graham did not reject the rele-
vance of incapacitation as a legitimate objective of the criminal-justice sys-
tem.  An extensive criminal history will often serve as a reliable indicator of a 
propensity to recidivate and thus justify a longer sentence for incapacitation 
purposes than might otherwise be suitable.  Yet Graham also stated, “Inca-
pacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the Eighth Amend-
ment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”
221
   
The Court thus seems to indicate that where there is a marked discon-
nect between culpability and sentence, the evidence for offsetting incapacita-
tion benefits must be quite strong.  Yet, the cases of concern here – cases of 
multiply-diminished culpability in the current offense and relatively non-
serious criminal history – are not apt to offer much by way of demonstrable 
incapacitation benefits.  It is quite doubtful, moreover, whether such a long 
and inflexible sentence as LWOP can ever be justified on incapacitation 
grounds, given the very low recidivism rates of elderly ex-convicts.
222
 
b.  Penalty-Diminution 
How severe should we regard the LWOP penalty provided by § 
841(b)(1)(A)?  There is the intriguing possibility, suggested by Miller and 
noted above, that the de facto phasing out of the American death penalty 
means that LWOP sentences should now be regarded as the most severe pun-
ishment for Eighth Amendment purposes.
223
  If that premise is accepted, then 
LWOP for a drug-only crime would have great difficulty surviving propor-
tionality review. 
However, assume the Court maintains the view articulated in Graham 
that LWOP is merely “the second most severe penalty permitted by law.”
224
  
As discussed above, Miller’s indications of an even closer “correspondence” 
between LWOP and the death penalty may be limited to the particularities of 
juvenile LWOP.
225
  If that is correct, then § 841(b)(1)(A) defendants would 
seemingly have to demonstrate that their culpability is at least twice dimin-
ished in order to establish a Graham violation.  Such a claim runs into the 
Scylla and Charybdis of Harmelin and Ewing.  Yet, for the reasons suggested 
above, the difficulties may not be impossible to overcome, particularly as to 
  
 221. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,  2029 (2010). 
 222. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Pa-
role Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 28-29 (2010); see also 
Berry III, supra note 108, at 1132-35 (presenting reasons to doubt incapacitation and 
deterrence benefits from LWOP sentences). 
 223. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 224. 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring and concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 225. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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various discrete subclasses of § 841(b)(1)(A) defendants – for instance, mari-
juana defendants whose criminal history does not satisfy the criteria for loss 
of mitigation.  And, of course, it remains possible to distinguish Harmelin 
and Ewing on the basis of the conditioning considerations. 
C.  Procedural Constitutionality: The Miller Claim 
Even if LWOP for drug-only three-strikers is not categorically unac-
ceptable under Graham, Miller may nonetheless prohibit the imposition of 
LWOP on these offenders on a mandatory basis if the risk of disproportion-
ality in individual cases is too high.  It is hard to know where to draw the line 
on risk of error but, as discussed above, Miller suggests two distinct types of 
factors that may be important.
226
  First, the analysis may turn on the presence 
of a super-mitigator, like juvenile status, that has profound, multifaceted, and 
highly individualized implications for culpability that in many cases are apt to 
render the sentence at issue disproportionately severe.  It is not clear that any 
analogous considerations exist with respect to the drug-only three-strikers.
227
   
Second, Miller also suggests that the uniquely harsh character of LWOP 
may render the sentence highly disfavored and unlikely to be approved for 
any offenders but adult killers, except in very unusual cases.  As to other of-
fenders, the facially-suspect nature of the sentence means that its imposition 
on a mandatory basis per se creates an unacceptably high risk of error.  
Whether or not this reading of Miller has anything to offer § 841(b)(1)(A) 
defendants depends on the uncertain question of whether it was LWOP gen-
erally or merely juvenile LWOP that provoked the Court’s concerns. 
  
 226. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 227. Perhaps one such consideration would be role in the offense.  The federal 
sentencing guidelines have long recognized that drug-trafficking organization include 
individuals serving in a wide range of different roles, and that those with less respon-
sibility in an organization should generally be treated more leniently than their super-
visors.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1-3B1.2 (2012).  The determi-
nation of an offender’s role and its impact on his culpability is often quite fact-
intensive and case-specific.  See Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1266-67 (1997) (describing 
case law differentiating “minor” and “minimal” participation in the offense).  As the 
Sentencing Commission’s research has demonstrated, the simple quantity of drugs 
attributed to a particular offender is a poor proxy for his role.  U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 173, at 168.  For that reason, although the quantity thresholds of 
§ 841(b)(1)(A) are intended to target the organizational big fish, the statute may be 
used about as often against medium and small fry.  See id. (showing that a little over 
eighty percent of high-level suppliers/importers and organizers/leaders are convicted 
of crimes carrying mandatory minimums, while over ninety percent of mid-level 
managers are, and over sixty-five percent of street-level dealers).  Thus, role in the 
offense may be similar to juvenile status insofar as it often has a large, mitigating 
effect on culpability, but demands individualized assessment in order to determine the 
full extent of the mitigation. 
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Finally, in considering whether a Miller claim offers stronger prospects 
for success than a Graham claim, it may also be important to consider the 
deference factors.  For instance, the frequency of mandatory LWOP         
sentences for drug-only offenders is likely much less than the overall        
frequency of LWOP sentences for such offenders.
228
  Similarly, international 
norms against mandatory LWOP are even stronger than the norms against 
LWOP generally.
229
   
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are good arguments in favor of overturning Ewing and Harmelin 
but, as long as these decisions remain good law and courts continue to take 
them seriously as precedent, they impose substantial obstacles to extending 
the protections of Graham and Miller to adults.  However, there are at least 
some categories of adults – such as marijuana offenders facing LWOP sen-
tences – who should be reasonably well-positioned to distinguish Ewing and 
Harmelin, even if they have some prior drug convictions. 
As to Ewing, it is important to recognize that the case did not involve an 
LWOP sentence, and the Court in Graham and Miller seemed to recognize 
that LWOP is qualitatively different for Eighth Amendment purposes from 
any other sentence of imprisonment.  Because Ewing did not involve an 
LWOP sentence, it does not preclude lower courts from adopting categorical, 
prophylactic LWOP-limiting rules analogous to what the Court adopted in 
Graham and Miller.   
Additionally, while Ewing makes clear that criminal history plays an 
important role in the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, the plurali-
ty did not adopt an “anything goes” approach to sentencing recidivists but 
instead emphasized the particularly aggravating specifics of Ewing’s own 
criminal history.  In effect, the plurality concluded that Ewing’s record 
  
 228. Only eight states mandate LWOP for any drug-only offenders.  See infra 
Appendix.  See also supra note 167 (indicating that only a minority of life-sentenced 
drug offenders have been convicted under statutory provisions that mandate a life 
sentence). 
 229. See, e.g., Van Zyl Smit, supra note 180, at 41 (noting that life sentences in 
the Netherlands, while permissible, are never mandatory); Vinter v. U.K., Nos. 
66069/09, 130/10 & 3896/10,  HUDOC, para. 106 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), avail-
able at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122664#{"itemid": 
["001-122664"]}. (“Contracting States must also remain free to impose life sentences 
on adult offenders for especially serious crimes such as murder: the imposition of 
such a sentence on an adult offender is not in itself prohibited by or incompatible with 
Article 3 or any other Article of the Convention. This is particularly so when such a 
sentence is not mandatory but is imposed by an independent judge after he or she has 
considered all of the mitigating and aggravating factors which are present in any giv-
en case.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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demonstrated what Miller later described as “irretrievable depravity.”
230
  But 
offenders with lesser criminal histories need not necessarily suffer this char-
acterization and its implications for categorical-proportionality review.  Final-
ly, Ewing may be distinguishable from some LWOP cases based on deference 
considerations, which take into account the number of offenders who re-
ceived three-strikes sentences like Ewing’s, the number of states with three-
strikes laws, the deliberateness of those enactments, and the ongoing shift 
away from acceptance of LWOP in international law. 
Harmelin may seem at first a more daunting obstacle, with the Court 
upholding a mandatory LWOP sentence on a first-time, adult drug offender.  
Yet, the controlling opinion was premised on the belief that high-volume 
cocaine trafficking was a serious violent crime, comparable to felony murder.  
More clearly nonviolent offenses should be readily distinguishable, including 
even drug offenses involving lesser quantities of drugs or different types of 
drugs.  Moreover, the controlling opinion also specifically praised the “care, 
clarity, and much deliberation” with which the challenged sentencing statute 
was crafted;
231
 not all LWOP statutes merit such accolades, and lesser defer-
ence to the legislature may be warranted where, as in Miller, LWOP was not 
adopted “through deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”
232
  
Finally, Harmelin himself did not argue that his sentence was inconsistent 
with international legal norms, and the Court did not explicitly consider the 
possibility; an offender raising the issue today may merit different treatment, 
particularly in light of the trend away from LWOP in international law. 
Graham and Miller constitute an important breakthrough, with the Court 
recognizing for the first time the unique and inhumane character of LWOP as 
a punishment.  Yet, at the same time, the Court avoided truly sweeping hold-
ings and the express reversal of precedent.  The Court’s “go-slow” approach, 
reflecting the values of judicial deference, may not be unjustified.  But, even 
with the reaffirmation of Ewing and Harmelin, the Court’s approach leaves 
room for lower courts to begin the process of extending Graham and Miller 
and developing principled limitations on the imposition of LWOP on adult 
offenders. 
  
 230. Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).  
 231. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1007-08 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 232. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2473. 
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Appendix 
Maximum Penalties for Drug Offenses in States 
 with Life Without Parole Sentences 
 
State Max Penalty for 
Drug Only  
Offender 
LWOP 
Mandatory? 
Max Penalty for 
Marijuana Only 
Offender 
Alabama LWOP
233
 Yes
234
 LWOP
235
 
Arizona Life with Parole
236
 N/A Life with Parole
237
 
Arkansas Life with Parole
238
 N/A Life with Parole
239
 
California 9 Years
240
 N/A 4 Years
241
 
Colorado 64 Years
242
 N/A 64 Years
243
 
Connecticut Life with Parole
244
 N/A 25 Years
245
 
Delaware LWOP
246
 Yes
247
 LWOP
248
 
  
 233. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9(c)(4) (2013) (LWOP for habitual felon with Class A 
felony); § 13A-12-231 (defining some drug trafficking crimes as Class A felonies). 
 234. § 13A-5-9(c)(4). 
 235. Id. (LWOP for habitual felon with Class A felony); § 13A-12-231 (defining 
trafficking in cannabis as Class A felony). 
 236. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3410 (2013). 
 237. Id. 
 238. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-401(a)(1), 5-4-501(a)-(b), 5-64-440(c) (2013) (traf-
ficking a controlled substance is a Class Y felony). 
 239. §§ 5-4-401(a)(1), 5-4-501(a)-(b), 5-64-440(c) (trafficking marijuana, a 
schedule VI substance, is a Class Y felony). 
 240. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(b) (West 2013).  
 241. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11360(a). 
 242. 2013 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 333 (S.B. 13-250) amending COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18–1.3–401.5 (West 2013) (defining drug felony levels and imprisonment), 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801 (habitual criminal penalty for level 1 drug felo-
ny with three prior felony convictions is sixty-four years imprisonment). 
 243. 2013 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 333 (S.B. 13-250) amending COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 18–1.3–401.5, 18-1.3-801, 18–18–406(b)(iii)(a) (West 2013) (dispensing 
marijuana is a level 1 drug felony at certain aggregate amounts).  
 244. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278(a) (West 2013).  
 245. § 21a-278(b). 
 246. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (b) (West 2012) (LWOP for habitual crimi-
nal with specifically enumerated drug felony). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. (LWOP for habitual criminal with specifically enumerated drug felony); 
tit. 16, § 4752(1) (possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a Tier 4 quantity 
controlled substance); tit. 16,  § 4751C(2) (Tier 4 quantity of Marijuana is four kilo-
grams or more). 
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Florida LWOP
249
 Yes
250
 LWOP
251
 
Georgia LWOP
252
 No 40 Years
253
 
Hawaii Life with Parole
254
 N/A Life with Parole
255
 
Idaho LWOP
256
 No LWOP
257
 
Illinois Life with Parole
258
 N/A Life with Parole
259
 
Indiana 50 Years
260
 N/A 12 Years
261
 
Iowa 150 Years
262
 N/A 150 Years
263
 
  
 249. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.135 (West 2013). 
 250. Id. 
 251. § 893.135(1) (trafficking in cannabis is 1st degree felony); § 
775.084(4)(a)(1) (life sentence for habitual felony offender who commits 1st degree 
felony); § 944.275(4)(b) (life sentenced prisoners must serve natural life). 
 252. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(c) (West 2013) (for fourth felony, offender must 
serve maximum sentence imposed by judge without parole eligibility); § 16-13-30(d) 
(for second or successive conviction for trafficking in controlled substances, judge 
may impose life). 
 253. § 16-13-32.4(b)(2).  
 254. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5(1)(c) (West 2013) (life with parole for repeat 
offender with Class A felony); § 712-1240.7(2) (methamphetamine trafficking in the 
1st degree is a Class A felony).  
 255. § 706-606.5 (1)(c) (life with parole for repeat offender with Class A felony); 
§ 712-1249.4 (commercial promotion or distribution of marijuana in the 1st degree is 
a Class A felony). 
 256. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2514 (West 2013) (person convicted for third time of 
felony may be sentenced to life); § 19-2513 (providing judge with discretion to in-
clude an indeterminate, parole-eligible portion of sentence). 
 257. § 19-2514 (person convicted for third time of felony may be sentenced to 
life); § 37-2732B(a)(1) (designating trafficking in marijuana as felony). 
 258. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401(a) (West 2013) (manufacturing or deliv-
ering various controlled substances is a Class X felony); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (West 2013) (natural life imprisonment for habitual criminal upon 
Class X felony conviction with two prior convictions); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/5-8-1(d)(1) (parole and mandatory supervised release for natural life imprisonment).  
 259. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (natural life imprisonment for 
habitual criminal upon Class X felony conviction with two prior convictions); 730 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (parole and mandatory supervised release for 
natural life imprisonment); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 550/5(g) (Class X felony for 
manufacture or delivery of cannabis exceeding five kilograms). 
 260. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-1(d) (West 2013) (Level 2 felony for dealing in at 
least twenty-eight grams of cocaine); § 35-50-2-8(i) (maximum twenty year sentence 
enhancement for habitual offender upon level 1 through 4 felony conviction with two 
prior unrelated felonies). 
 261. § 35-48-4-10(c) (Level 5 felony for dealing in at least ten pounds of marijua-
na); § 35-50-2-8(i) (maximum six year sentence enhancement for habitual offender 
upon level 5 or 6 felony conviction with two prior unrelated felonies). 
 262. IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.401(1)(a) (West 2013) (defining some drug manu-
facturing and delivery crimes as class B felonies subject to maximum of fifty years 
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Kansas 34 Years
264
 N/A 34 Years
265
 
Kentucky Life with Parole
266
 N/A Life with Parole
267
 
Louisiana LWOP
268
 Yes
269
 LWOP
270
 
Maine 10 Years
271
 N/A 10 Years
272
 
Maryland 40 Years
273
 N/A 5 Years
274
 
Massachusetts 20 Years
275
 N/A 15 Years
276
 
Michigan LWOP
277
 Yes
278
 30 Years
279
 
  
imprisonment); § 124.411(1) (upon second and subsequent drug convictions, sentenc-
ing may be enhanced up to three times the allowable term).   
 263. § 124.401(1)(a) (marijuana manufacturing and delivery exceeding one thou-
sand kilograms subject to maximum fifty year sentence); § 124.411(1) (upon second 
and subsequent drug convictions, sentencing may be enhanced up to three times the 
allowable term).   
 264. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5703(b)(3) (West 2013) (defining drug severity level 
1 felony for unlawful manufacturing of controlled substances); § 21-6805(e) (drug 
offense sentencing grid with sentence enhancement for prior convictions of unlawful 
manufacturing of controlled substances).  
 265. § 21-5703(b)(2) (defining drug severity level 1 felony for multiple convic-
tions); § 21-6805(e) (drug offense sentence enhancement for prior convictions of 
unlawful manufacturing of controlled substances).  
 266. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1432(2) (West 2013) (Class A felony for sec-
ond and subsequent conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine); § 532.080(6)-
(7) (maximum life imprisonment for first degree persistent felony offender with Class 
A or B felony upon third felony conviction).  
 267. § 218A.1421(4)(b) (Class B felony for trafficking in five or more pounds of 
marijuana); § 532.080(6)-(7) (maximum life imprisonment for first degree persistent 
felony offender with Class A or B felony upon third felony conviction). 
 268. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (2013) (imposing LWOP for third 
drug felony punishable by ten years or more); § 40:966(b) (authorizing sentences of 
greater than ten years for various drug offenses, including marijuana trafficking). 
 269. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b).  Louisiana courts do have discretion, however, to im-
pose a lesser sentence if LWOP would be unconstitutionally excessive.  Louisiana v. 
Sims, 123 So. 3d 806, 814 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013). 
 270. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b).   
 271. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1103(1-A)(A) (2006) (trafficking a schedule W 
drug is a Class B crime); tit. 17-A, § 1252(A) (ten year maximum for Class B Crime).  
 272. tit. 17-A, § 1103(1-A)(A) (trafficking twenty or more pounds of marijuana is 
a Class B crime); tit. 17-A, § 1252(A) (ten year maximum for Class B Crime). 
 273. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-608(d)(1) (West 2013) (forty year mandato-
ry minimum sentence for fourth-time offender of various narcotics-based crimes); 
CRIM. LAW § 5-905(a)(1) (doubles sentence authorized for repeat drug offenders).  
 274. CRIM. LAW § 5-612(c)(1) (five year mandatory minimum sentence for manu-
facture or distribution of fifty or more pounds of marijuana); CRIM. LAW § 5-
905(a)(1) (doubles sentence authorized for repeat drug offenders). 
 275. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 32E(c)(4) (West 2013) (maximum twenty 
years imprisonment for trafficking heroine).  
 276. § 32E(a)(4) (maximum fifteen years imprisonment for trafficking marijuana). 
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Minnesota 40 Years
280
 N/A 40 Years
281
 
Mississippi LWOP
282
 Yes
283
 LWOP
284
 
Missouri LWOP
285
 No LWOP
286
 
Montana Life with Parole
287
 N/A Life with Parole
288
 
Nebraska Life with Parole
289
 N/A 60 Years
290
 
Nevada LWOP
291
 No LWOP
292
 
New Hampshire Life with Parole
293
 N/A 40 Years
294
 
New Jersey Life with Parole
295
 N/A Life with Parole
296
 
  
 277. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(2)(a)(i)-(iv) (West 2013) (narcotic drug 
manufacturing and delivery penalties ranging from less than twenty years to life im-
prisonment); § 333.7413(1)(a)-(b) (mandatory life sentence for second and subse-
quent conviction for violation of 333.7401(2)(a)(ii) or (iii)).  
 278. § 333.7413(1). 
 279. § 333.7401(2)(d) (maximum fifteen year sentence for marijuana manufacture 
or delivery exceeding forty-five kilograms); § 333.7413(2) (sentence doubled for 
various second and subsequent drug convictions).  
 280. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.021 (West 2013) (forty year sentence for second of 
subsequent conviction of selling various drugs in aggregate amounts). 
 281. Id.  
 282. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-29-139(f) (West 2013) (mandatory LWOP for drug 
manufacture or distribution in aggregate amounts).  
 283. Id. 
 284. Id.  
 285. MO. REV. STAT. § 195.222 (2006).  
 286. § 195.222(7)(2). 
 287. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(3)(a) (2013).  
 288. § 45-9-101(4). 
 289. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(7) (2013) (defining manufacture or delivery 
of cocaine exceeding 140 grams as a Class IB felony); § 28-105 (maximum of life 
imprisonment for class IB felonies).  
 290. § 28-416(12) (defining possession of one pound or more of marijuana as a 
Class IV felony); 28-105 (maximum of life imprisonment for class IV felonies); § 29-
2221(1) (maximum of sixty years imprisonment for habitual criminal upon third felo-
ny conviction).  
 291. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.010(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2011 
76th Regular Session of the Nevada Legislature, and technical corrections received 
from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (2012)).  
 292. Id. 
 293. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(a)(1)-(4) (2013) (maximum life impris-
onment for second or subsequent manufacture of specific drugs various amounts). 
 294. § 318-B:26(b)(6) (maximum forty years imprisonment for second or subse-
quent manufacture of marijuana in five pounds or more). 
 295. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-5(b)(1) (West 2013) (first degree crime for manu-
facture of heroin at specified amount);  § 2C:43-6(f) (second and subsequent convic-
tions for drug manufacturing crimes are subject to extended term);  § 2C:43-7(c) 
(extended term of life imprisonment  for first degree crime under § 2C:43-6(f)). 
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New Mexico 26 Years
297
 N/A 26 Years
298
 
New York 25 Years
299
 N/A 25 Years
300
 
North Carolina 23.5 Years
301
 N/A 18.5 Years
302
 
North Dakota Life with Parole
303
 N/A 20 Years
304
 
Ohio 11 Years
305
 N/A 8 Years
306
 
Oklahoma Life with Parole
307
 N/A Life with Parole
308
 
  
 296. § 2C:35-5(b)(10)(a) (first degree crime for manufacture of marijuana exceed-
ing twenty five pounds); § 2C:43-6(f) (second and subsequent convictions for drug 
manufacturing crimes are subject to extended term); 2C:43-7(c) (extended term of life 
imprisonment  for first degree crime under § 2C:43-6(f)). 
 297. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-20 (B)(2) (West 2013) (first degree felony for 
second or subsequent conviction for various manufacture and distribution drug of-
fenses); § 31-18-15 (A)(3) (eighteen years imprisonment for first degree felony); § 
31-18-17(C) (eight year sentence increase for habitual criminal with three or more 
prior felony convictions).  
 298. § 30-31-20(B)(2) (first degree felony for second or subsequent conviction for 
manufacture of schedules I through V controlled substances); § 30-31-6 (C)(10) (ma-
rijuana is a schedule I substance); § 31-18-17(C) (eight year sentence increase for 
habitual criminal with three or more prior felony convictions). 
 299. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.75 (McKinney 2013) (first degree manufacture of 
methamphetamine is a class B felony); PENAL LAW § 70.10 (Class A-I felony for 
persistent felony offender with third non-violent felony conviction); PENAL LAW § 
70.00 (twenty-five year maximum imprisonment for Class A-I felony conviction).  
 300. PENAL LAW § 221.55 (first degree criminal sale of marijuana is a class C 
felony); PENAL LAW § 70.10 (Class A-I felony for persistent felony offender with 
third non-violent felony conviction); PENAL LAW § 70.00 (twenty-five year maximum 
imprisonment for Class A-I felony conviction). 
 301. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-95(h)(3b)(c) (West 2013) (trafficking in over 400 
grams of methamphetamine is a Class C felony with a maximum 23.5 year sentence). 
 302. § 90-95 (h)(1)(d) (trafficking in over 10,000 pounds of marijuana is a Class 
D felony with a maximum 18.5 year sentence).  
 303. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-03.1-23(1)(a) (West 2013) (defining manufac-
ture or delivery of methamphetamine as a Class A felony); § 12.1-32-09(2)(a) (life 
imprisonment for habitual offender with a Class A felony conviction and two Class C 
or higher prior felony convictions). 
 304. § 19-03.1-23(1)(b) (defining manufacture or delivery of marijuana as a Class 
B felony); § 12.1-32-09(2)(a) (maximum twenty years for habitual offender with a 
Class B felony conviction and two Class C or higher prior felony convictions). 
 305. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03 (C)(4)(g) (West 2013) (trafficking in over 
100 grams of cocaine is a first degree felony); § 2929.14 (A)(1) (maximum of eleven 
years for a first degree felony).  
 306. § 2925.03 (C)(3)(g) (trafficking in over 40 kilograms of marijuana is a sec-
ond degree felony but can amount to a first degree felony in certain circumstances); § 
2929.14 (A)(2) (maximum of eight years for a second degree felony). 
 307. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401(B)(1) (West 2013) (maximum life impris-
onment for manufacturing or distributing schedule I or II narcotic drugs). 
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Oregon 20 Years
309
 N/A 10 Years
310
 
Pennsylvania 30 Years
311
 N/A 20 Years
312
 
Rhode Island Life with Parole
313
 N/A Life with Parole
314
 
South Carolina LWOP
315
 Yes
316
 LWOP
317
 
South Dakota 50 Years
318
 N/A 50 Years
319
 
Tennessee 60 Years
320
 N/A 60 Years
321
 
  
 308. § 2-401(B)(2) (maximum life imprisonment for manufacturing or distributing 
schedule I through IV controlled substances); § 2-204 (C)(12) (marijuana is a sched-
ule I substance).  
 309. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.752(1)(a) (West 2013) (manufacture or delivery 
of a schedule I controlled substance is a Class A felony); § 161.605(1) (twenty years 
imprisonment for a class A felony).  
 310. § 475.856(2) (manufacture of marijuana is a Class B felony); § 161.605(1) 
(ten years imprisonment for a class B felony). 
 311. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(f)(1) (West 2013) (maximum fifteen years 
imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II narcotic drug); § 780-
115(a) (doubled sentence upon second or subsequent convictions under § 780-
113(a)(30)). 
 312. § 780-113(f)(1.1) (maximum ten years imprisonment for manufacture or 
delivery of over 1,000 pounds of marijuana); § 780-115(a) (doubled sentence upon 
second or subsequent convictions under § 780-113(a)(30)). 
 313. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28-4.01(a)(2) (West 2013) (maximum life impris-
onment for manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II controlled substances). 
 314. § 21-28-4.01.2(a)(3), (b) (maximum life imprisonment for possession, manu-
facture, or sale of more than five kilograms of marijuana). 
 315. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(B)(1), (C)(2)(a)-(b) (2013)  (LWOP for        
third conviction of serious offense including trafficking controlled substances); § 44-
53-370(e) (defining trafficking controlled substances with various aggregate amounts 
and penalties). 
 316. § 17-25-45(B). 
 317. § 17-25-45(B)(1), (C)(2)(a)-(b) (LWOP for third conviction of serious of-
fense including trafficking controlled substances); § 44-53-370(e)(1) (defining traf-
ficking marijuana with various aggregate amounts). 
 318. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-6 (2013) (Class 3 felony to possess more than 
ten pounds of marijuana); § 22-7-8.1 (sentence moves up two felony levels upon 
fourth non-violent felony conviction); § 22-6-1(4) (maximum fifty years imprison-
ment for class 1 felony conviction).   
 319. § 22-42-7 (Class 3 felony to distribute more than one pound of marijuana); § 
22-7-8.1 (sentence moves up two felony levels upon fourth non-violent felony convic-
tion); § 22-6-1(4) (maximum fifty years imprisonment for class 1 felony conviction).   
 320. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(j)(1) (West 2013) (Class A felony for manu-
facture, delivery, or sale of 150 grams or more of heroine); § 40-35-108(a)(2) (career 
offender with fourth Class A felony conviction is sentenced under Range III); § 40-
35-112(c)(1) (maximum sixty years imprisonment with Range III Class A felony 
conviction). 
 321. § 39-17-417(j)(13A) (Class A felony for manufacture, delivery, or sale of 
300 pounds or more of marijuana); § 40-35-108(a)(2) (career offender with fourth 
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Texas Life with Parole
322
 N/A 99 Years
323
 
Utah Life with Parole
324
 N/A 15 Years
325
 
Vermont Life with Parole
326
 N/A Life with Parole
327
 
Virginia Life with Parole
328
 N/A Life with Parole
329
 
Washington 20 Years
330
 N/A 10 Years
331
 
West Virginia Life with Parole
332
 N/A Life with Parole
333
 
Wisconsin LWOP
334
 Yes
335
 29 Years
336
 
  
Class A felony conviction is sentenced under Range III);40-35-112(c)(1) (maximum 
sixty years imprisonment with Range III Class A felony conviction). 
 322. HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.112(e) (West 2013) (maximum life imprisonment 
for manufacture or delivery of penalty group 1 drugs). 
 323. HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.120(b)(6) (maximum ninety-nine years imprison-
ment for manufacture or delivery of marijuana exceeding 2,000 pounds).  
 324. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a), (b)(i) (West 2013) (first degree felony 
upon second and subsequent convictions for manufacture or production of schedule I 
or II controlled substances); § 76-3-203(1) (maximum life imprisonment for first 
degree felony).  
 325. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (b)(i) (second degree felony for possession of 100 pounds 
or more of marijuana); § 76-3-203(2) (maximum fifteen years imprisonment for sec-
ond degree felony).  
 326. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4231(c)(1) (West 2013) (maximum thirty years 
imprisonment for trafficking in cocaine at 150 grams or more); tit. 13, § 1 (offenses 
with maximum sentences exceeding two years are considered felonies); tit. 13, § 11 
(life imprisonment for offender upon fourth or subsequent felony conviction). 
 327. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 423o(c) (maximum thirty years imprisonment for 
trafficking in marijuana at fifty pounds or more); tit. 13, § 1 (offenses with maximum 
sentences exceeding two years are considered felonies); tit. 13, § 11 ((life imprison-
ment for offender upon fourth or subsequent felony conviction). 
 328. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(H)(5) (West 2013) (maximum life imprisonment 
for manufacture, sale, or distribution of 100 grams of methamphetamine).  
 329. § 18.2-248(H)(4)-(5) (maximum life imprisonment for manufacture, sale, or 
distribution of 100 kilograms of marijuana). 
 330. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.401(1)-(2)(a) (West 2013) (maximum ten 
years imprisonment for Class B felony of manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II 
narcotic drugs); § 69.50.408(1) (sentence doubled for various drug offenses upon 
second or subsequent convictions).   
 331. § 69.50.401(2)(c) (maximum five years imprisonment for Class C felony of 
manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II controlled substances); § 69.50.204(c)(22) 
(marijuana is a schedule I controlled substance); § 69.50.408(1) (sentence doubled for 
various drug offenses upon second or subsequent convictions). 
 332. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4-401(a)(i) (West 2013) (maximum fifteen years 
imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of schedule I or II narcotic drugs); § 61-11-
18(c) (life with parole upon third conviction of crime “punishable in a penitentiary”).  
 333. § 60A-4-401(a)(ii) (maximum five years imprisonment for manufacture or 
delivery of schedule I, II or III controlled substance); § 60A-2-204 (d)(19) (marijuana 
is a schedule I controlled substance); § 61-11-18(c) (life with parole upon third con-
viction of crime “punishable in a penitentiary”). 
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Wyoming 40 Years
337
 N/A 20 Years
338
 
D.C. 60 Years
339
 N/A 10 Years
340
 
 
 
  
 334. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62(2m) (West 2013) (mandating LWOP for “persis-
tent repeaters,” based on commission of at least three “serious felonies,” and defining 
“serious felonies” to include various violations of Chapter 961, Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act). 
 335. Id. 
 336. § 939.50(3)(e) (setting maximum penalty for Class E felony as fifteen years); 
§ 961.41(1)(h)(5) (defining high-volume marijuana trafficking offenses as Class E 
felonies); § 961.46 (adding five years to maximum for distribution to minor); § 
961.48(1)(b) (adding four years for repeat offense); § 961.49(1m) (adding five years 
for distribution in certain protected places). 
 337. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (West 2013) (maximum twenty years 
imprisonment for manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine or other schedule I 
and II narcotic drugs); § 35-7-1038(a) (sentence doubled upon second or subsequent 
conviction for various drug crimes).  
 338. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (maximum ten years imprisonment for manufacture or 
delivery of other schedule I and II controlled substances); § 35-7-1014(d)(xiii) (mari-
juana is a schedule 1 controlled substance); § 35-7-1038(a) (sentence doubled upon 
second or subsequent conviction for various drug offenses). 
 339. D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(a)(2)(A) (2013) (maximum thirty years imprison-
ment for manufacture or distribution of schedule I and II narcotic or abusive drugs); § 
48-904.08(a) (sentence doubled upon second or subsequent conviction for various 
drug crimes). 
 340. § 48-904.01(a)(2)(B) (maximum five years imprisonment for manufacture or 
distribution of schedule I, II, or III controlled substances); § 48-902.08(a)(6) (canna-
bis designated as schedule III substance); § 48-904.08(a) (sentence doubled upon 
second or subsequent conviction for various drug crimes). 
